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to the “deconstruction of the administrative state,”1 the phrase was imme-
diately itself deconstructed by all manner of news media.2 Perhaps this 
declaration was offered as a familiar tenet of classical libertarianism,3 sig-
 
 1 Bannon made this comment while still a White House staffer, at the Conservative Po-
litical Action Conference (“CPAC”), where he gave a joint interview with former White 
House Chief of Staff Reince Preibus. Bannon laid out three overarching policy goals of the 
Trump administration: bolstering “national security and sovereignty;” instituting “economic 
nationalism;” and finally, the “deconstruction of the administrative state.” See Ryan Teague 
Beckwith, Read Steve Bannon and Reince Priebus’ Joint Interview at CPAC, TIME (Feb. 23, 
2017), https://perma.cc/3VVE-WQDB. Bannon’s articulation of this conceptual troika sug-
gested that the administration would pursue an economic vision that is racist, anti-immigrant, 
and war-keen (and thus extremely anti-worker), as well as virulently competitive and favoring 
of an unfettered free market. See Max Fisher, Stephen K. Bannon’s CPAC Comments, Anno-
tated and Explained, N.Y. TIMES: INTERPRETER (Feb. 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/E83R-K2NQ 
(“Bannon often cites sovereignty to argue that trade deals or other forms of cooperation will 
necessarily suborn American interests. This is different from isolationism . . . . Rather, it is 
nationalism, which demands engagement [in global trade] but on ruthlessly competitive 
terms.”). 
 2 See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 1 (“[Bannon implies that the state] is not an instrument of 
the American electorate, nor even a hurdle to be overcome as mainline conservatives often see 
it, but rather an adversary innately hostile to the people.”); see also Philip Rucker & Robert 
Costa, Bannon Vows a Daily Fight for ‘Deconstruction of the Administrative State,’ WASH. 
POST (Feb. 23, 2017), https://perma.cc/UPN3-EXM2 (interpreting comments Bannon made 
and terms he used throughout the interview); Phillip Carter, The Trump Administration’s Not-
So-Benign Neglect, SLATE (Feb. 24, 2017, 6:03 PM), https://perma.cc/ZH9M-FRTE (suggest-
ing that the idea put forth in Bannon’s statement has materialized in the Trump administra-
tion’s failure to appoint staff to federal positions and agencies, as well as in the appointment 
of unqualified or inexperienced personnel to such positions). The latter piece concludes that 
this is not dysfunction, but rather a deliberate attempt to prevent the federal government from 
fully functioning, and to “undo the state that has evolved since the New Deal.” Phillip Carter, 
The Trump Administration’s Not-So-Benign Neglect, SLATE (Feb. 24, 2017, 6:03 PM), 
https://perma.cc/ZH9M-FRTE; see also David French, Trump Wants to Deconstruct the Reg-
ulatory State? Good. Here’s How You Start, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 24, 2017, 10:36 PM), 
https://perma.cc/B2AE-2ZC2 (in a familiar conservative take, lauding the Trump administra-
tion’s interest in dismantling the executive branch, which purportedly acts not for the public 
good but bureaucracy itself, and suggesting that the President and administrative agencies 
begin by abdicating power—in general, the power to promulgate rules—and allowing Con-
gress to legislate the administration’s policy goals into being). Despite Bannon’s resignation 
and subsequent fall from grace, the three pillars of the policy he articulated continue to stand. 
See, e.g., Danny Vinik, The Radical Idea Buried in Trump’s State of the Union, POLITICO (Feb. 
1, 2018, 6:24 PM), https://perma.cc/XG9W-YQNA (outlining Trump’s continued commit-
ment to the deconstruction of the administrative state by drastically reorganizing the federal 
bureaucracy and reshaping federal agencies); Jeremy W. Peters, Trump’s New Judicial Litmus 
Test: Shrinking ‘the Administrative State’, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/KXE8-4GPG (discussing how the Trump administration pairs judicial nomi-
nees with its administrative deregulation priorities). 
 3 Favoring, as its core principle, “regulation” of the economy by the free market and a 
corresponding rejection of economic regulation by the government. See, e.g., David Boaz, Key 
Concepts of Libertarianism, CATO INST. (Jan. 1, 1999), https://perma.cc/7KKB-UY7Y (“Free 
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naling to conservatives and proponents of small government that support-
ive services for the poor and impediments to unfettered growth of busi-
ness and capital were in danger. Perhaps it was an indication of a more 
total obliteration4 of the core functions of executive agencies, signaling to 
a variable right-oriented, right-leaning, or right-parallel5 congregation 
 
markets are the economic system of free individuals, and they are necessary to create wealth. 
Libertarians believe that people will be both freer and more prosperous if government inter-
vention in people’s economic choices is minimized.”). 
 4 While Bannon was a campaign staffer and later Chief Strategist, there was some anxi-
ety in the media around his purported Leninism. Apparently, Bannon told Ronald Radosh—
former Communist Party member turned conservative thinker and historian—at a party at 
Bannon’s townhouse that he was a Leninist, and like Lenin, aimed to destroy the state. See 
Ronald Radosh, Steve Bannon, Trump’s Top Guy, Told Me He Was ‘a Leninist’, DAILY BEAST 
(Aug. 22, 2016, 1:00 AM), https://perma.cc/ABN7-VK7T. Radosh, who critiqued the concept 
of a “no-fault [Marxist] revolution” as “a fantasy . . . no longer tenable,” in light of the Soviet 
Russian government’s human rights violations, see Rick Perlstein, When Leftists Become Con-
servatives, NATION (Mar. 23, 2015), https://perma.cc/8B92-PEM9, was “[s]hocked . . . . “ Ra-
dosh, supra. It bears noting that Lenin, in his interpretation of Marx, called for the destruction 
of the bourgeoisie state, and the seizing of control by the proletariat, which in large part in-
volved a nationalizing of resources and the means of production. See generally V.I. Lenin, 
THE STATE AND THE REVOLUTION 22-33 (1918) (Robert Service trans., 1993). Lenin, quoting 
Marx, opens his seminal work, THE STATE AND THE REVOLUTION, by reflecting on the neces-
sity of the proletariat “wrest[ing] . . . all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instru-
ments of production in the hands of the state, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling 
class.” Id. at 22-23. This notion is rather contrary to that of the deconstruction of the adminis-
trative state. Lenin differs from Marx—and gains his reputation as an advocate of destruc-
tion—in part due to his proposal that the seizing of the state should not happen “by degree,” 
and asks whether “is it conceivable that such an organization [a proletariat-controlled state 
government] can be created without first abolishing, destroying the state machine created by 
the bourgeoisie for themselves?” Id. at 25. This is not to suggest that Bannon is cryptically 
advocating for state-owned industry or divestment of power from the political classes to the 
working classes. He most certainly is not; though, like Lenin, he may see the working class as 
a political force that need not understand itself. See, e.g., NEIL HARDING, LENIN’S POLITICAL 
THOUGHT 122 (1983) (“Lenin’s argument was that the workers did not have to come into 
socialist consciousness to acquire political consciousness.”). Bannon, or at least some of those 
interpreting him, may have heavily dichotomized two notions: the administrative state as force 
which, in part, defends the working class against a corporate supremacy, and the administra-
tive state as a corrupt and entrenched bourgeoisie institution off of which the rich profit—
believing one a fantasy and the other a reality. 
 5 By “right-parallel,” I intend to capture the cacophony of political theories (though in 
some instances “political theory” may be too generous) that have risen to mainstream view 
out of the dark caverns of the so-called “alt-right” internet. White nationalist conspiracy the-
orists, anarchist misogynists, teenagers who fancy themselves nihilists—an incoherent, dis-
jointed assemblage of theory, rage, misinterpretation, who frequently celebrate racism, capi-
talism, and white supremacy. See generally Evan Malmgren, Don’t Feed the Trolls, DISSENT 
(2017), https://perma.cc/BUL8-VNJ3 (discussing the factions and ideological alignments of 
the so-called “alt-right” internet, including the intermingling of “nihilistic troublemakers” 
with “committed racists,” and tensions between “white nationalists, who see their political 
identity rooted in their race” and “civic nationalists, whose nationalism is grounded in citizen-
ship”). 
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that powers delegated to the state would be shifted to the private sphere, 
the market, or a faction of unelected nationalist ideologues close to the 
President.6 In either case, there was no positive interpretation for workers 
or for organized labor. 
Stationed in the broader context of the administration’s political ap-
pointments, “the deconstruction of the administrative state” has taken the 
shape of an attack on social programs for workers and the poor:7 the dis-
solution of regulations, corporate power hobbling workers, their safety, 
and wealth;8 the narrowing or extinguishing of avenues for the forces of 
organized labor to formally represent workers bringing grievances against 
their employers;9 and perhaps a deconstruction of the apparatus on which 
 
 6 See Editorial Board, President Bannon?, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION (Jan. 30, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/45LL-2NZ4 (speculating about the powers accorded to Bannon and his influ-
ence over the executive branch, prior to his expulsion or departure from the administration); 
Editorial Board, Donald Trump Keeps It in the Family, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION (Jan. 13, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/J4KU-PBZA (reporting on the appointment of Trump’s son-in-law, Jared 
Kushner, to an unelected advisory position); Glenn Thrush & Jennifer Steinhauer, Stephen 
Miller Is a ‘True Believer’ Behind Core Trump Policies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/NR8Q-JVMC (commenting on the influence of former far-right gadfly cum 
White House adviser, Stephen Miller). 
 7 See, e.g., Derek Thompson, Things Are About to Get Much Worse for Poor Americans, 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 9, 2016), https://perma.cc/N5UD-DQCC; Tracy Jan & Steve Mufson, If 
You’re a Poor Person in America, Trump’s Budget Is Not for You, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG 
(Mar. 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/2L6A-86T8 (discussing the Trump administration’s first 
proposed budget, which cut funding to low-income housing and homelessness programs, food 
support programs like Meals on Wheels, and legal aid services for low-income people). 
 8 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,777, 88 Fed. Reg. 12,285 (Mar. 1, 2017) (requiring exec-
utive agencies, like the Department of Labor, to appoint a task force to review the agency’s 
existing regulations and repeal or modify those out of keeping with the administration’s policy 
goals); Dave Jamieson, Trump Repeals Regulation Protecting Workers from Wage Theft, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 27, 2017, 3:40 PM), https://perma.cc/PLJ4-CNNG (discussing the 
repeal of the Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces rule, which required the federal government to 
terminate contracts with contractors with records of wage and safety violations if they did not 
comply with wage and safety law). 
 9 The passage of national so-called right-to-work laws, see Dave Jamieson, Republicans 
Want to Pass a National Right-to-Work Law, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 1, 2017, 11:25 AM), 
https://perma.cc/6HK6-V3AX, or the success of Janus v. AFSCME, 851 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 
2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 54 (2017), will make it difficult for public sector unions to get 
the funds they need to administer the contract to the entirety of the workers in the bargaining 
unit, if only some were required to pay fees and dues. Additionally, recent activity at the Na-
tional Labor Relations Boar d narrowed the scope of some of the rights protected under the 
National Labor Relations Act. See Boeing Co., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 154 (Dec. 14, 2017). The 
Board, propelled by the pro-management Trump appointees Marvin Kaplan and William 
Emanuel, repealed a number of prior decisions, notably, Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 
343 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (Nov. 19, 2004), which prohibited facially neutral workplace policies 
that, interpreted reasonably, might encroach on the right to organize under the National Labor 
Relations Act. See Boeing Co., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 154 (Dec. 14, 2017). 
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unions themselves rest.10 Particularly notable is the successful appoint-
ment of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court,11 fresh from a decade of pro-
corporation, anti-worker legal gymnastics on the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,12 at an extremely critical time for unions—
 
 10 The installation of national right-to-work has, as its ultimate objective, the destruction 
of the functional union in general. On the subject of right-to-work, Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr. said: 
 
In our glorious fight for civil rights, we must guard against being fooled by false 
slogans, such as “right to work.” It is a law to rob us of our civil rights and job rights. 
Its purpose is to destroy labor unions and the freedom of collective bargaining by 
which unions have improved wages and working conditions of everyone. 
 
Martin Luther King on “Right to Work”, ECON. POL’Y INST.: QUICK TAKES (Apr. 4, 2011), 
https://perma.cc/A5MJ-K53M (quoting Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in a statement made in 
1961). 
 11 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Neil Gorsuch Is Sworn In as Supreme Court Justice, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/WTU9-VS7U (recounting the history of Gorsuch’s conten-
tious nomination, believed by some Congressional Democrats to be an invalid appointment to 
a position that should have been filled by Judge Merrick Garland, former President Obama’s 
appointee, filibustered by Senate Democrats, and ultimately, most memorable for Senate Re-
publicans’ lowering the number of majority votes required to confirm a Supreme Court nom-
inee). 
 12 See, e.g., Hannah Belitz, The Supreme Court Vacancy and Labor: Neil Gorsuch, 
ONLABOR (Jan. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/5WHC-2FP4 (reviewing several decisions involv-
ing labor unions and workers, demonstrating an anti-labor trend). In his confirmation hearing, 
Gorsuch came under fire for his dissent in the “Case of the Frozen Trucker.” See Mark Ber-
man, The ‘Case of the Frozen Trucker’ Emerges Again, WASH. POST: POLITICS (Mar. 21, 2017, 
1:28 PM), https://perma.cc/24RY-HSEU. In the case, TransAm Trucking, Inc. v. Admin. Re-
view Bd., 833 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2016), a trucker, Alphonse Maddin, was fired after the 
brakes on his vehicle froze and he was forced to pull over. Id. at 1208-09. He radioed for help 
and waited for several hours in the cold; the heat in the truck’s cab had broken. Id. at 1209. 
After waiting, he radioed again and was told to wait; he found that he couldn’t feel the lower 
half of his body and that his speech was slurred. Id. While the cab of the truck was operable, 
the truck and trailer when conjoined were not. Id. He detached the cab of the truck and left the 
trailer on the side of the road because he believed it was necessary to save his life. Id. at 1209. 
TransAm fired Maddin for abandoning his trailer. Id. Maddin’s case, because it was so horri-
fying, made for a perfect defense—the law prohibits firing where a worker “refuses to operate 
a vehicle because [of] . . . a reasonable apprehension of serious injury.” Id. at 1211. Of every 
federal judge who heard the case, Gorsuch wrote the only dissent. See Amy Goodman & Denis 
Moynihan, Neil Gorsuch and the Case of the Frozen Trucker, DEMOCRACY NOW (Mar. 23, 
2017), https://perma.cc/8BBD-WQCU. Gorsuch found TransAm’s argument, that Maddin had 
in fact operated his vehicle because he left the scene in the truck’s cab persuasive, despite the 
well-established legal principle known as Chevron deference, mandating that courts defer to 
the administrative agency—here, the Department of Labor—in the agency’s interpretation of 
the statute under review. See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Neil Gorsuch and the “Frozen 
Trucker”, SLATE (Mar. 21, 2017, 10:38 AM), https://perma.cc/5G68-546H. Gorsuch did not 
offer a different interpretation of the word “operate,” nor did he investigate the ambiguity of 
other words in the statute, such as “vehicle.” Id. He insisted, despite the governing principle 
of Chevron, the ambiguity of the statute, and the clear public policy interest in avoiding serious 
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a time in which the constitutionality of agency fees13 hung in the bal-
ance.14 
 
injuries in the workplace, that he had to follow the letter of the law. Id. Legal scholars criti-
cized this dissent as evidence of an “arrogant and cold judicial personality.” Id. Maddin’s 
attorney characterized the dissent as a defense of his client’s “legal right to stay in the truck 
and freeze to death.” Goodman & Moyhnihan, supra (quotation marks omitted). 
  On the issue of Chevron deference, Gorsuch has espoused his own sense of the decon-
struction of the administrative state. He has advocated for the dismantling of the doctrine, 
which favors administrative agencies. 
 
[T]he reality is that Judge Gorsuch embraces a judicial philosophy that would do 
nothing less than undermine the structure of modern government — including the 
rules that . . . regulate the financial markets and protect workers and consumers. In 
strongly opposing the administrative state, Judge Gorsuch is in the company of in-
cendiary figures like the [former] White House adviser Steve Bannon, who has 
called for its “deconstruction.” 
Businesses have always complained that government regulations increase their 
costs, and no doubt some regulations are ill-conceived. But a small group of con-
servative intellectuals have gone much further to argue that the rules that safeguard 
our welfare and the orderly functioning of the market have been fashioned in a way 
that’s not constitutionally legitimate. This once-fringe cause of the right asserts, as 
Judge Gorsuch put it in a speech last year, that the administrative state “poses a 
grave threat to our values of personal liberty.” 
 
Emily Bazelon & Eric Posner, The Government Gorsuch Wants to Undo, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 
2017), https://perma.cc/WB3S-ELRT. 
  In fact, Gorsuch justifies his adverseness to Chevron deference by relying on New Deal 
Era anti-worker precedent, if not akin to Lochner, in its legal reasoning, discussed infra note 
35, then related in its anti-worker, pro-business motivations. See Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45 (1905). Schechter Poultry Corp. invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(“NIRA”), which instituted workplace safety provisions and wage and hour regulations for 
workers in the poultry industry. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 
495 (1935) The NIRA’s Achilles heel was its delegation to the executive branch the power to 
approve “fair competition” standards, a mechanism for restraining free market competition by 
instituting price controls and standards of market conduct. Id. The Supreme Court, not yet 
willing to support Franklin D. Roosevelt, found that Congress’s delegation to the executive 
was an impermissible abdication of its responsibility to make law. See id. at 529. Gorsuch, in 
his crusade against Chevron deference, and, by extension, administrative power, cites 
Schechter Poultry though it has been impliedly overruled. See United States v. Frank, 864 
F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1988). The fact of Gorsuch’s reliance on precedent which invalidates re-
sistance to the free market and worker protections in his quest to lessen the power of what he 
considers to be a “titanic administrative state,” reinforces a sense that the deconstruction of 
the administrative state, in the era of Trump, means a brutalization of legal structures erected 
to protect workers. Bazelon & Posner, supra. 
 13 Agency fees, discussed at length infra Part II, are fees charged to non-members in a 
union shop, in lieu of union dues. Agency fees are designed to pay for the costs of collective 
bargaining, which benefit all workers, be they members or non-members of the union. 
 14 See generally Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (mem.) 
(per curiam), reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 2545 (2016) (leaving the Ninth Circuit ruling intact). 
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Freidrichs v. California Teachers Association,15 a case on the con-
stitutionality of agency fees charged by public sector unions, was brought 
before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, appealed 
to the Supreme Court of the United States, and granted certiorari.16 In 
January 2016, the Court heard oral arguments on the case.17 In February 
2016, Justice Antonin Scalia, one of the Court’s cohort of conservative 
justices, died unexpectedly.18 In March 2016, the Court deadlocked with 
eight justices and left undisturbed the Circuit Court’s decision preserving 
the constitutionality of agency fees.19 
One year later, a nearly identical case, Janus v. American Federation 
of State, County, and Municipal Employees Council 31, was decided in 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.20 The plain-
tiffs, understanding that the appellate court was bound by the precedent 
Friedrichs had nearly toppled, asked the court to rule in favor of their 
opponents.21 By exhausting their remedies in the circuit courts, they could 
petition for a writ of certiorari to appear before the Supreme Court and 
finish what Friedrichs started: stripping agency fees of their constitution-
ality. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in September 201722 and 
heard oral argument in February 2018.23 
This article was written at an uncertain time in American history and 
in labor history. At the time of this writing, the right of unions to collect 
agency fees from non-members occupies a precarious and diminishing 
space between these two judicial decisions. By the time of publication, 
that gap will likely have closed, and any imagining of an alternate future 
will take on an incontrovertibly theoretical dimension. Readers will likely 
experience this article’s perspective on the outcome of Janus as an under-
stood but not yet realized reality. The article’s call, however, to under-
stand the union as something beyond a service provider, predates and will 
postdate Janus. The proliferation of the right to work narrative necessi-
tates an answer, especially during a moment where it appears to have 
reached the apex of its power. 
 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Transcript of Oral Argument, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 
(2016) (No. 14-915), 2016 WL 344760. 
 18 Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 13, 2016), https://perma.cc/QY4E-QT9V. 
 19 Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. at 1083. 
 20 Janus v. AFSCME, 851 F.3d 746, 747-48 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 54 
(2017) (mem.). 
 21 Id. at 747. 
 22 Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 54 (2017) (mem.). 
 23 Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 
SCOTUSBLOG, https://perma.cc/G8PL-9M35 (last visited Apr. 18, 2018). 
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In this article, I review the inadequacy of First Amendment argu-
ments in opposition to agency fees, and attempt to reframe the union as a 
commonly-managed infrastructure, an antithesis to the privatization, un-
equal access, and isolation which characterize this historical moment. In 
analyzing the union as a commons, I seek to not only bolster the case for 
the constitutionality—and necessity—of agency fees, but to recognize the 
value—and necessity—of commonly-managed resources at a point in his-
tory where the powerful narrative of the supremacy of individual rights 
over collective rights permeates legal analysis, and where the concentra-
tion of power at the pinnacle of hierarchical structures is understood as 
the standard. 
This introduction locates the reader in the historical moment and re-
views the state of the federal government with special attention to issues 
of workers’ rights. Part I briefly reviews the nature of agency fees and 
their foil, “right to work” laws, as well as the unfixed nature of political 
speech doctrine as it is employed in the agency fee fight. Part II discusses 
the doctrinal history of agency fees First Amendment exceptionalism, and 
the arguments articulated in Friedrichs, Janus, and related precedent. Part 
III explores the theory of the union as commons, applying economic the-
ories of commonly-managed infrastructure to agency shop unions, and 
then explores the efficacy of the use of the commons as a lens through 
which to understand the fallibility of the First Amendment in the agency 
fee context. 
I. UNION STRUCTURES AND STRICTURES: POLITICAL SPEECH AND THE 
AGENCY FEE FRAMEWORK 
Union fees, dues, and agreements requiring workers to join a union 
upon hire have been subject to stringent critique.24 In a unionized or par-
tially unionized workplace, the union must represent all workers, whether 
or not they are members.25 Non-members who benefit from union repre-
sentation are often conceptualized as “free riders.”26 The free rider theory 
 
 24 A wealth of academic critique exists. See, e.g., Shirley V. Svorney & Melanie Stallings 
Williams, Bad Math: How Non-Union Employees Are Unconstitutionally Compelled to Sub-
sidize Political Speech, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 135 (2016). 
 25 See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., Right to Fair Representation, https://perma.cc/6X7T-
AXMC (last visited Apr. 18, 2018). 
 26 See Nina Totenberg, Is it Fair to Pay Dues to a Union You Don’t Agree With?, NPR 
(Jan. 11, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://perma.cc/UN5K-3M79 (discussing the concept of free rid-
ers). 
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is prevalent throughout economics27 and was initially a theory of the ex-
ploitation of public goods designated for public use.28 The notion of a 
member of society benefitting from a common good without contributing 
to its upkeep is telling in the context of the union, as it accepts as its prem-
ise that the union performs a positive function or provides a valuable re-
source to all who use it. In the union context, a free rider is a worker who 
does not pay union membership dues but benefits from the employment 
contract provisions, such as pay increases, workplace safety standards, 
and access to benefits.29 
Unions have dealt with the issue of free riders in a number of ways. 
In some instances, unions have sought to require workers coming into a 
workplace to join the union via union security contracts—in which the 
union negotiates a union shop agreement with an employer requiring 
workers to join the union after a grace period.30 Alternately, the union 
could negotiate an agency shop agreement.31 Under an agency shop agree-
ment, workers are not required to join the union but must pay an agency 
fee, also called a fair share fee, which covers the cost of negotiating and 
administering the contract.32 The legality of such a union security agree-
ment was litigated in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, and has been 
a hallmark of federal labor law since the inception of the National Labor 
Relations Act.33 However, the Labor-Management Relations Act reserves 
to the states the power to diminish the rights of unions,34 and so-called35 
 
 27 RUSSELL HARDIN, The Free Rider Problem, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (2003), https://perma.cc/PEY4-AXDL. 
 28 Id. 
 29 See Totenberg, supra note 26. 
 30 48 AM. JUR. 2D LABOR AND LABOR RELATIONS § 1062 (2018). 
 31 See id. § 1063. 
 32 Id.; see also Totenberg, supra note 26 (noting that agency fees are also called fair share 
fees and explaining their function in covering the bread-and-butter benefits covered by the 
contract). 
 33 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 34 Better known as the Taft-Hartley Act, the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C 
§§ 141-197 (2012), gave states the right to work option. See Bashar H. Malkawi, Labor and 
Management Relationships in the Twenty-First Century: The Employee/Supervisor Dichot-
omy, 12 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 1, 5 (2008) (“Just like the NLRA, the Taft-Hartley Act defined a 
slate of ‘unfair labor practices.’ But if the NLRA used this term to define unfair management 
practices against labor, Taft-Hartley defined unfair practices by labor against management. 
Where the NLRA granted workers the right to organize, the Taft-Hartley Act gave employers 
the right to oppose union organization. Some Taft-Hartley highlights include allowing states 
to pass right-to-work statutes, requiring unions to give notice prior to striking, the prohibition 
of closed shops, and the outlawing of secondary boycotts.”). 
 35 Critiques of the “right to work” terminology abound; the phrase is frequently likened 
to the “liberty of contract” right celebrated by the notorious case, Lochner, in which the Court 
upheld exceedingly long work hours for bakers, reasoning that limiting their work hours would 
deprive them of the personal right to sell their labor. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 45 
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“right to work” laws in twenty-eight states made union shop and agency 
shop security agreements illegal.36 Janus soon followed. 
 
(1905). Both the phrase “liberty of contract” and Lochner are frequently invoked as shorthand 
for exploitation and unscrupulous labor practices. Herbert Hill, labor secretary for the NAACP 
wrote that: 
 
[W]hile the slogan [“Right to Work”] sounds fair and equitable, in reality it is based 
on a total disregard for the truth.  
The phrase “Right to Work” sounds good and honest and has been used to cap-
ture the sympathy of those who favor a square deal for wage earners. But when such 
a slogan is advanced by . . . union-busting open shop employers and takes root in 
states where civil rights and liberties are systematically violated and where gover-
nors and congressmen have openly announced their defiance of basic constitutional 
guarantees, then every citizen has a right to view the slogan with great suspi-
cion . . . . 
Does the slogan “Right to Work” mean that every person has an inalienable 
right to work? If that is so, then we have certainly reached the millennium . . . Does 
the slogan mean that every worker has the right to a job and to receive work at fair 
wages, reasonable hours and under other decent labor standards? . . . 
Or does the slogan mean that workers have a right to work but only under con-
ditions unilaterally established by their employers? Is the slogan “Right to Work” a 
revival of the old concept of “liberty of contract”[?] 
 
See Herbert Hill, “Right to Work” Laws and the Negro Worker, 65 CRISIS 327, 327-28 (1958). 
  William Safire, famed lexicologist and journalist, remembered in part for his tenure as 
a speechwriter for Nixon, and a self-proclaimed libertarian, Michael Elliott, William Safire: 
Pundit, Provocateur, Penman, TIME (Sept. 28, 2009), https://perma.cc/V9KD-P5T2, traced 
the etymology of the phrase, writing rather candidly that “[m]anagement has won the battle of 
semantics with organized labor . . . . Right to work is a management slogan that has been 
adopted as the generic term for anti-compulsory-union legislation, which labor refers to as 
‘union busting laws.’” WILLIAM SAFIRE, Right to Work, in SAFIRE’S POLITICAL DICTIONARY 
627 (2008). Safire, citing Socialist Eugene Debs as the initial popularizer of the phrase, and 
following the thread through Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal era “economic bill of 
rights,” refers to this appropriation of the phrase as “taking a negative or defensive position 
and fashioning it into a positive slogan,” comparing it to anti-abortion advocates rebranding 
themselves as “pro-life.” Id. 
 36 See, e.g., Ross Eisenbrey, So-Called “Right-to-Work” Laws Will Lower Wages for Un-
ion and Non-Union Workers in Missouri, WORKING ECON. BLOG (Jan. 19, 2017, 12:51 PM), 
https://perma.cc/C2PX-D5QX; see also Right to Work Laws and Bills, Nat’l Conf. of State 
Legislatures, https://perma.cc/UA9X-5VXS (last visited Apr. 18, 2018). The result of this has 
been swift and categorical. Workers in right-to-work states earn lower wages than their un-
ionized counterparties. See Elise Gould & Will Kimball, “Right-to-Work” States Still Have 
Lower Wages, ECON. POL. INST. (Apr. 22, 2015), https://perma.cc/XS3V-JDXE. This article 
updated a 2011 study on wages in right to work states to account for more recent data and 
found that “[w]ages in RTW states are 3.1 percent lower than those in non-RTW states, after 
controlling for a full complement of individual demographic and socioeconomic factors as 
well as state macroeconomic indicators. This translates into RTW being associated with 
$1,558 lower annual wages for a typical full-time, full-year worker.” Id. Right-to-work laws 
drag down the wages of both union and nonunion workers. 
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A great deal of manufactured anxiety37 around agency fees, an anxi-
ety which ultimately provided the foundation for First Amendment claims 
challenging agency fees, came from a concern with the union’s political 
role. Unions are not confined to the locale of the workplace, but because 
labor issues are often captured in—or endangered by—legislation and the 
political sphere, they are also actors in the broader political world. Un-
ions, as political actors, endorse candidates, campaign for legislation, and 
spend money to advance political causes.38 It is this latter function that 
opponents of agency fees have utilized as a toehold for First Amendment 
action. 
Unions are not permitted to use money paid by non-members for po-
litical purposes; agency fees must be used only to cover the costs of bar-
gaining for the contract and administering its terms.39 
Though the distinction between money spent on negotiating the un-
ion contract and enforcing its terms, applicable to all the workers in a 
 
 37 Manufactured via untruths propagated by anti-union forces. See, e.g., this statement 
given by Rebecca Friedrichs, the named plaintiff in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Associ-
ation, in an interview: 
 
When I was a student teacher in 1987, I was being trained by an outstanding master 
teacher, but next door to us was a teacher who had become, in my opinion, abusive 
to her little first graders. I would witness every day as she would be lining them up 
outside the classroom. She’d grab them by the arms, she’d yank them over, she’d 
yell right in their faces. I asked my master teacher, “What can we do about this awful 
situation?” She sat me down and she said, “Today is your lesson on the teachers 
union.” She told me about tenure and that districts really struggle to rid themselves 
of these teachers. And I was shocked. 
 
At that point I was really soured on union representation. 
 
Emma Brown, Two Teachers Explain Why They Want to Take Down Their Union, Wᴀsʜ. Pᴏsᴛ 
(Aug. 11, 2015), https://perma.cc/7KCE-GSRA. 
  Friedrichs premises her rejection of the union on the notion that it protects abusive 
teachers. This is not true. Tenured teachers can be fired when they are abusive. See id. This 
myth, that tenure (and, by proxy, unionization) protects teachers who behave inappropriately 
is a popular one. See, e.g., Perry Chiaramonte & Jack Ellis, Dirty Dozen: 12 Bad Teachers 
Protected by Tenure and Unions, FOX NEWS (Jun. 17, 2014), https://perma.cc/BYG3-YYX4. 
 38 See, e.g., Ctr. for Responsive Politics, “AFL-CIO,” OPENSECRETS, 
https://perma.cc/Y95Q-NFYM (tracking the union’s political spending from 1998 to the pre-
sent). 
 39 Commc’n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 735 (1988) (“[The] exaction of 
agency fees beyond those necessary to finance collective bargaining activities violated judi-
cially created duty of fair representation and nonunion members’ First Amendment rights.”); 
see also Totenberg, supra note 26. (“[T]hey are required to pay an amount that covers the 
costs of negotiating the contract and administering it. The idea is that they reap the bread-and-
butter benefits covered by the contract — wages, leave policies, grievance procedures, etc. — 
so they should bear some of the cost of negotiating that contract. They do not, however, have 
to pay for the union’s lobbying or political activities.”). 
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workplace, and money spent elsewhere, appears straightforward, a nu-
anced question of what constitutes the political is nonetheless implicated 
in categorizing the spending. 
A. The Political, “Political,” and the Penumbra 
The political in the context of the union may be best conceptualized 
as three layers—the first layer is the explicitly political. In the political 
sphere, for example, something that is seen as expressly political is con-
tributing money to a political candidate’s campaign. The second layer in-
volves issues that may be perceived by some as related to representing 
workers, and others as “political”—for example, politicized identity 
markers. The third layer is the union itself as a political entity, which col-
ors any and all money it collects or spends with a kind of political penum-
bra. 
The first layer is easy to interpret. Expenditures on the mechanisms 
of the political machine—elected officials, policy campaigns, ballot 
measure endorsements—fall within a cognizable, expressly political 
realm. 
The second is less so. Anti-union forces have expressed some anxi-
ety about what exactly constitutes an expense related to representing 
workers. The conservative weekly, the Washington Examiner, alleged40 
that the California Teachers’ Association (“CTA”) had written off as a 
cost of representing workers a “conference on gay-lesbian-bisexual-
transgender issues.”41 Though the piece makes it unclear what conference 
is being discussed, it may be the annual LGBTQ Conference put on by 
the CTA to “address issues affecting LGBTQ+ educators,” such that the 
union may, presumably, represent those workers’ issues to management 
more effectively.42 
The Washington Examiner article is telling in that it captures, if sub-
tly, the notion that the mere existence of LGBTQ workers is “political,” 
in that their identity is somehow linked to policy and that money spent on 
them is somehow akin to money spent on a political agenda. The Exam-
iner points out that the CTA also “contributed 1 million in 2008 to an 
effort by liberal groups to defeat Proposition 8, which defined marriage 
as an act between a man and a woman.”43 This follows the discussion of 
 
 40 Steven Malanga, When Unions Use Non-member Dues to Finance Political Activities, 
WASH. EXAM’R: OP. (Apr. 29, 2014, 12:00 AM), https://perma.cc/EUS9-93EW. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Calendar: GLBT Issues Conference, Cal. Teachers Ass’n., https://perma.cc/Y5KN-
9DA9 (last visited May 5, 2018). 
 43 Malanga, supra note 40. 
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the conference but apparently is not related to it. The article does not pro-
pose that the union attempted to write off this support as money spent on 
representing workers and ensuring that the collective bargaining agree-
ment was enforced. It appears to be called up as an oblique attempt to link 
representation of workers with an ongoing political campaign having to 
do with the rights of LGBTQ people in general;44 that money spent on 
workers is related to the rights of those workers, and others, as determined 
by the ballot or the legislature. It exposes a rather tenuous (at best—at 
worse, an imagined) link between the political and the “political.” It is 
this type of thinking that gives the third layer of the political or “political” 
its justification, and gives First Amendment arguments in the agency fees 
context their heart. 
The third layer of the political conceives of the very existence of the 
union as political; through this lens, the payment of an agency fee for the 
cost of negotiating and administering a collectively bargained-for agree-
ment is a political expense. This notion capitalizes on an easy conflation 
of an understanding of the right to organize a union and bargain collec-
tively as a political right,45 and political speech as illuminated in classic 
First Amendment doctrine.46 
 
 44 The personal is political, but to suggest that expenditure on LGBTQ workers is political 
because they are LGBTQ is to suggest that the very existence of LGBTQ workers is a cause 
that may be agreed with, a position that may be endorsed. 
One of the plaintiffs in Friedrichs, Harlan Elrich, subscribed to this understanding of the po-
litical, also in the context of queer workers. In an interview, he said: “I realized much of what 
the union does goes against my beliefs. Recently in California they had the vote on same-sex 
marriages. I am against same-sex marriages, and from my understanding the union put a lot 
of money into supporting them.” Brown, supra note 37. 
 45 Enshrined in the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947) (“Employees 
shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”). 
 46 See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry 
into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 307-08, 332-42 (1978) (re-
viewing the history of political speech doctrine and the substance of major judicial decisions). 
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This misunderstanding is further confused by the Supreme Court’s 
evolving interpretation of “political speech.” The Court reiterates repeat-
edly47 that speech of a political nature, in the political realm,48 is at the 
very “core” of the First Amendment; it is the reason for and true subject 
of the First Amendment.49 If this originalist and high-minded premise is 
accepted, then political speech is at the forefront of the forefront,50 the 
pinnacle of the pinnacle of sacred American rights. The Court’s treatment 
of the political speech doctrine has, by some estimations, somewhat pro-
faned that right by taking an expansive view of the expenditure of 
money.51 Arguments might be made that the Court has, in its development 
of the doctrine, subscribed to a realistic view of money’s influence on the 
political sphere, in acknowledging that money functions as speech in that 
it expresses endorsement, support, and agreement. Arguments, however, 
have been made—and perhaps vindicated—that an understanding of 
money as speech turns the First Amendment into a tool that harms de-
mocracy,52 into a conduit for corporate power. 
 
 47 See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966) (“Whatever differences may exist 
about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a 
major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. 
This of course includes discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the 
manner in which government is operated or should be operated, and all such matters relating 
to political processes.”); see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) 
(“[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”); see also Amicus 
Curiae Brief of the Am. Civil Rights Union in Support of Appellant Citizens United at 2, 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 
132718, at *2 (“This case involves core political speech protected by the First Amendment, 
long recognized as a fundamental foundation of our democracy. Such core political speech 
enjoys the maximum possible protection under our Constitution. Yet, a federal agency claims 
the legal authority to prohibit the broadcast of such core political speech.”). 
 48 The political realm rather than “pornography or nude dancing,” according to the Amer-
ican Civil Rights Union in their amicus brief for Citizens United. See Supplemental Brief for 
Amicus Curiae the Am. Civil Rights Union in Support of Appellant Citizens at 4, Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-205) (“The freedom to engage 
in such speech is exactly what the First Amendment is all about. Such political speech, 
not pornography or nude dancing, is the core concern of the Amendment, and consequently 
entitled to its highest possible protection.”). 
 49 See Mills, 384 U.S. at 218. 
 50 The First Amendment is often conceptualized in arguments as the most sacred of the 
Bill of Rights, positioned at the top of the document for its importance. In fact, prior to the 
ratification process, the First Amendment was not first. See RUTHANN ROBSON, FIRST 
AMENDMENT: CASES, CONTROVERSIES, AND CONTEXTS 7-8 (1st ed. rev. 2016). 
 51 See Kyle Langvardt, Imagining Change Before and After Citizens United, 3 ALA. C.R. 
& C.L. L. REV. 227, 235-38 (2012). 
 52 See id. at 234. Professor Langvardt argues that protecting corporate expenditure as 
speech under the First Amendment is inherently incongruous with the democratic political 
process: 
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Money was initially folded into the political speech doctrine in the 
campaign finance context in Buckley v. Valeo, which was brought on the 
heels of the Watergate scandal and the subsequent interest of Congress in 
corruption and the fallibility of the political system.53 This interest was 
captured and codified in the Federal Election Campaign Act, which Buck-
ley challenged on First Amendment grounds.54 The legislation placed lim-
its on the amount of money that could be donated to a political campaign 
and the amount of money a campaign could spend on advertising. A chal-
lenge was brought on a freedom of speech and freedom of association 
theory.55 The Court, navigating the passage between public disgust with 
the capacity of campaign finance to create quid pro quo economies and 
the framing of limited expenditure as “suppressing communication,” 
drew a distinction between speech spent by an individual on a campaign, 
and speech spent by a campaign on advertising—contributions were con-
stitutionally limitable, advertising expenditures were not.56 The Court rea-
soned that the government interest in preventing corruption or the sugges-
tion of corruption attached to contributions but not expenditures.57 And, 
while contributions constituted an endorsement of a candidate, advertis-
ing might touch on a vaster landscape, and a more sacred one—the dis-
cussion of political ideas, issues, and subjects of debate.58 From this broad 
concept, it was not a difficult climb to Citizens United, which, at base, 
found that corporate-funded political propaganda is protected “political” 
 
[W]e cannot hope to enhance the voice of ordinary people by allowing our . . . busi-
ness corporations to politick as if they were citizens. Any argument for such a policy 
assumes [a] false premise[] . . . that the corporate voice is as valuable to the political 
process as the expressed thoughts of potential voters . . . . Unlike human beings, 
business corporations are bred for perpetual strife. They survive by undercutting the 
competition, by guarding secrets, by exacting the highest price the market will per-
mit . . . . [O]ur politics suffer when parochial and selfish interests crowd out the 
shared interests of the nation as a whole. 
 
Id.; see also John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: History, Data 
and Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 264 (2015) (“[T]he corporate takeover of the 
First Amendment represents a pure redistribution of power over law with no efficiency 
gain . . . . That power is taken from ordinary individuals with identities and interests as voters, 
owners and employees, and transferred to corporate bureaucrats pursuing narrowly framed 
goals with other people’s money.”). 
 53 See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 17. 
 57 Id. at 17-20. 
 58 See id. at 19. 
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speech.59 Citizens United is perhaps best known to laypeople60 for its par-
ticularly naked embrace of corporate personhood,61 the legal theory that 
applies rights commonly associated with individuals to corporate enter-
prises.62 The question of what (or who) corporations constitute is less rel-
evant here than the question of what constitutes a corporation. The ruling 
in Citizens United expanded First Amendment protection to the political 
speech of corporations and of non-profit organizations.63 Several of the 
latter non-profit organizations wrote amicus briefs in support of the ap-
pellant media corporation,64 including the controversial and conservative 
gun rights poster-child, the National Rifle Association;65 the corporate 
cheerleader and free market propaganda mouthpiece, the Cato Institute;66 
 
 59 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 60 Or at least, in my estimation. In 2010, when Citizens United was decided, there was a 
great deal of outrage expressed at social gatherings that “corporations are people now.” 
 61 One thinks of Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, stringing together a series of 
pluralities and dissents to express that “[c]orporations and other associations, like individuals, 
contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas’ that the 
First Amendment seeks to foster’ . . . . The Court has thus rejected the argument that political 
speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First 
Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’” Citizens United, 558 
U.S. at 343 (internal citations omitted). 
 62 In this instance, free speech. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 
(2014), free exercise of religion. But also, less controversial, rights “to own and transfer prop-
erty . . . to enter and enforce contracts, to initiate and defend lawsuits, and so on.” Lyman 
Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate Responsibility: Corporate Per-
sonhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1143 (2012). 
 63 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365. 
 64 Itself a non-profit—Citizens United is actually a “social welfare organization” under 
Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)4, see FAQs, CITIZENS UNITED, https://perma.cc/3JPQ-ZPEY 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2018), and ostensibly a documentary production company, see All Films, 
CITIZENS UNITED, https://perma.cc/A264-M2VE (last visited Apr. 18, 2018), often accused of 
creating wildly misleading libertarian and conservative propaganda pieces, see, e.g., Anti-
McAuliffe “Documentary” Continues Citizens United’s Long History of Dishonest Propa-
ganda, BRIDGE PROJECT (July 30, 2013) https://perma.cc/8VSN-8DDA (describing Citizens 
United film and commercial projects as “viciously dishonest propaganda”). 
 65 Brief of Amicus Curiae Nat’l Rifle Ass’n in Support of Appellant on Supplemental 
Question, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-205), 2009 
WL 2359481, at *1. 
 66 Supplemental Brief for Amicus Curiae Cato Inst. in Support of Appellant, Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2365223, at*1. 
The Cato Institute has been an amplifier for fringe free market theory on behalf of corporate 
interests—especially in the oil industry. Launched by the Koch brothers, 
 
it has consistently pushed for corporate tax cuts, reductions in social services, and 
laissez-faire environmental policies. When President Obama, in a 2008 speech, de-
scribed the science on global warming as “beyond dispute,” the Cato Institute took 
out a full-page ad in the Times to contradict him. Cato’s resident scholars have re-
2018] RIGHTS IN COMMONS 301 
and the most recognizable face of the American labor movement, the 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(“AFL-CIO”).67 
Though Citizens United makes no distinction between for-profit cor-
porate lobbying activities and lobbying and political advocacy by labor 
organizations, political expenditure by labor unions is different than cor-
porate expenditure. Federal law requires that unions disclose expenditures 
publicly,68 and, in some circumstances, requires unions to obtain the con-
sent of members before making a particular expenditure.69 Corporations, 
by contrast, need only disclose their expenditures under very particular 
conditions, are not mandated by law to make expenditure information 
available publicly, and have no obligation to seek consent from share-
holders.70 
Though the AFL-CIO’s amicus brief calls on the Court to distinguish 
between corporate and business expenditure and that of labor unions and 
other non-profits,71 it nevertheless forges an alliance between labor and 
 
lentlessly criticized political attempts to stop global warming as expensive, ineffec-
tive, and unnecessary. Ed Crane, the Cato Institute’s founder and president, told 
[journalist Jane Mayer] that “global-warming theories give the government more 
control of the economy.” 
 
Jane Mayer, Covert Operations: The Billionaire Brothers who are Waging a War Against 
Obama, NEW YORKER (Aug. 30, 2010), https://perma.cc/GNN6-RBVH. 
 67 Brief for the Am. Fed’n of Labor and Congress of Indus. Orgs. as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Appellants at 1, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) 
(No. 08-205). 
 68 See Liz Kennedy & Sean McElwee, Do Corporations & Unions Face the Same Rules 
for Political Spending?, DĒMOS (July 15, 2014), https://perma.cc/F73V-UZWZ. 
 69 See id. 
 70 Id. at 6. 
 71 This is generous. The brief groups unions and corporations together in the first argu-
ment it makes, that McConnell v. Federal Election Commission should be overturned, and that 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”) § 203, 52 U.S.C. § 30101 (2002), provision 
prohibiting union and corporate funding of “electioneering communications” should be inval-
idated as unconstitutionally overbroad. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 
310, 318 (2010); Brief of the Am. Fed’n of Labor and Congress of Indus. Orgs. As Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Appellant, Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010) (No. 08-205). This is a canny positioning, as McConnell and the BCRA treat unions 
and corporations as one type of entity. See id. 
  The brief does distinguish between unions and corporations in its second and third ar-
guments, contending that the government’s interest in preventing corruption does not justify 
restrictions on speech, and that there is no compelling government interest offered to justify 
prohibiting union expenditures, writing: 
In upholding § 203 [the BCRA provision at issue], McConnell recited concern about 
“the special characteristics of the corporate structure [that] require particularly care-
ful regulation” but recited none about unions . . . . Austin [v. Michigan Chamber of 
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corporations.72 The AFL-CIO made a strategic choice to further its own 
interests despite the dangerous implications of its argument.73 A more 
 
Commerce, a case in which the Supreme Court found constitutional a Michigan stat-
ute prohibiting corporations from using corporate treasury funds for independent 
expenditures supporting or opposing candidates for office, which was ultimately 
overruled by Citizens United] identified “a different form of corruption” than had 
Buckley, namely, “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of 
wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little 
or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” 
 
Whatever the correctness of this holding as to the [Michigan] Chamber [of 
Commerce], the Court squarely rejected its applicability to unions in denying the 
Chamber’s equal-protection [sic] claim that the state law under-inclusively failed 
also to apply to unincorporated labor organizations. The Court reasoned that unions 
have “crucial differences” from corporations: first, although unions too “may be 
able to amass large treasuries, they do so without the significant state-conferred ad-
vantage of the corporate structure”; and, second, “the funds available for a union’s 
political activities more accurately reflect members’ support for the organization’s 
political views than does a corporation’s general treasury” because a union may not 
compel represented non-members to support, with dues or other fees, the union’s 
political, legislative and other ideological spending that is not directly germane to 
“collective bargaining, contract administration and germane adjustment.” 
 
Brief of the Am. Fed’n of Labor and Congress of Indus. Orgs. As Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Appellant, Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-205) 
2009 WL 2365216, at *15-16 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis in origi-
nal). 
 72 In that it calls on the Court to overturn McConnell and the BCRA § 203, 52 U.S.C. 
§ 30101 (2002). 
 73 The brief’s argument advances a position dangerous to its own interests by making 
points helpful to corporations, entities which seek to undercut and extinguish union power. 
If one could characterize this as “siding with corporate interests”—in this case perhaps a little 
deliberately obtuse, it would not be the only time the AFL-CIO sided with corporate interests. 
In September 2016, for example, the Federation released a statement to the press endorsing 
the controversial Dakota Access Pipeline project, over protests from its rank-and-file mem-
bership and affiliate organizations. In acknowledging the protest actions against the pipeline, 
the Federation wrote that it was “fundamentally unfair to hold union members’ livelihoods 
and their families’ financial security hostage to endless delay.” Press Release, AFL-CIO Pres-
ident Richard Trumka, Dakota Access Pipeline Provides High Quality Jobs, AFL-CIO (Sept. 
15, 2016), https://perma.cc/XR7Q-96X8. The AFL-CIO, effectively siding with the vast net-
work of corporate funders, shareholders, subsidiaries and sub-subsidiary corporations over the 
working- and middle-class community of indigenous North Dakota residents and their neigh-
bors. For more information on labor movement involvement in resistance to the pipeline, see 
Labor for Standing Rock, FACEBOOK, https://perma.cc/KNY9-7ZLL (last visited May 26, 
2018). For more information on the enmeshed network of corporate involvement, please see 
Jo Miles & Hugh Macmillan, Who’s Banking on the Dakota Access Pipeline, FOOD & WATER 
WATCH (Sept. 6, 2016), https://perma.cc/S6SE-N6Z6. 
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flattering read might suggest that the AFL-CIO, recognizing the inevita-
ble growth of corporate power, resourcefully slipstreamed in its wake in 
order to consolidate some power of their own.74 
Whatever its strategic angle, the filing of the amicus brief was per-
ceived as support for Citizens United and the corporate campaign finance 
apparatus. The AFL-CIO pushed back strenuously on this narrative.75 
AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka, speaking at a National Press Club 
event a year and a half after the ruling, accused the Supreme Court of 
“breaking” the federal election system by ruling in favor of the appellant 
in Citizens United: “The campaign finance laws need to be changed, so I 
for one would be for an overhaul . . . . I’d start at the Supreme Court prob-
ably because they believe that money equals free speech. That’s what 
their decision said.”76 Though the spirit of Trumka’s sentiment— a favor-
able reading might capture the notion that private corporate wealth has an 
outsize influence on campaign finance— is salvageable, consonant with 
labor’s values, the statement is rather oblivious given that the AFL-CIO’s 
entire amicus brief, which asked the Court to grant the decision Trumka 
references, was premised on the concept of the expenditure of money as 
speech and therefore subject to First Amendment protection. Though the 
amicus brief advocated for a privileging of union “money [as] free 
 
 74 The usefulness of this potential strategic motivation has been subject to some ridicule. 
From this perspective, any power gained is inconsequential in the face of corporate wealth. In 
a piece criticizing union support for the appellant Citizens United, John Nichols, national af-
fairs correspondent for the Nation, wrote that this support “neglect[s] the reality that one cor-
poration—Goldman Sachs—spends more annually just to pay its top employees than the com-
bined assets of all the nation’s major unions.” John Nichols, Unions Can’t Compete with 
Corporate Campaign Cash, NATION: BUSINESS BLOG (Jan. 24, 2010), https://perma.cc/FD5Z-
ASC7. In the same vein, Rose Ann DeMoro, the executive director of National Nurses United, 
said that “[e]quating what unions and working people could spend on campaigns [with corpo-
rate expenditures] would be like comparing a toy boat to an aircraft carrier.” Id. 
 75 See, e.g., John Nichols, AFL-CIO Letter Details Role In, Position on Citizens United 
Case, NATION: CRIM. JUST. BLOG (Jan. 29, 2010), https://perma.cc/Z84G-BBHQ (including a 
response from an AFL-CIO lawyer and author of the Citizens United amicus brief, Laurence 
Gold, to Nichols’ article criticizing the ALF-CIO’s position on the case). 
 
The AFL-CIO believes that the Court wrongly treated corporate expenditures the 
same as union expenditures . . . . Perhaps the most notably disturbing feature of the 
Citizens United decision is its unrestrained enthusiasm for the role that business 
corporations play in American life . . . . On campaign finance matters, the AFL-CIO 
supports a system of regulation that promotes democratic participation in elections 
by individuals and their associations. Id. 
 
 76 Matt Cover, AFL-CIO Trumka: Electoral Process ‘Broken’ by Supremes in Citizens 
United Case, CNS NEWS (May 20, 2011, 4:58 PM), https://perma.cc/2GQA-X32L. 
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speech”77 over an interpretation that includes corporations, it nevertheless 
supported the premise of the argument by accepting money as speech. 
Did the AFL-CIO’s participation in the Citizens United decision 
make the argument that agency fees are not political more or less tenable? 
By arguing that First Amendment protections extend to independent ex-
penditures (by the union) for “electioneering communications,”78 did the 
AFL-CIO undermine the labor movement’s position by fully accepting 
that, as Trumka says, “money equals free speech”?79 By engaging in a 
legal argument likely to open a Pandora’s box of corporate influence in 
the political sphere, special interest dominance in social policy, and se-
crecy in political funding, did the AFL-CIO place unions in the path of 
fanatical right to work campaigns and strenuous employer-driven, anti-
union pushback? 
By participating and standing to benefit, did the AFL-CIO lend 
weight to the argument that unions are, themselves, inherently political, 
and that collective bargaining cannot be divorced from the AFL-CIO’s 
bargaining tactics as described in its amicus brief, asking the Court for 
more influence to elect more labor-friendly candidates and strengthen la-
bor rights in the workplace? Or, did the AFL-CIO’s participation in Citi-
zens United highlight the different roles a union might play, and the dis-
tinction between the political sphere—candidates, endorsement, and 
legislative campaigns—and the union’s in-house role in the workplace as 
an administrator of agreed-upon terms—benefits, pay structure, and 
health and safety issues? 
Ultimately, it will remain unclear whether and to what extent the un-
ion participated in or became associated with a dangerous narrative of 
political overreach here. Challenges to union vitality continued to climb 
through the courts irrespective of union strategy. 
II. PAST AND FUTURE INTERPRETATIONS: THE COLLAPSING FIRST 
AMENDMENT SHELTER FOR AGENCY FEES 
An initial challenge to the constitutionality of agency fees came in 
1977 in Abood.80 The Detroit Federation of Teachers had negotiated a 
contract requiring teachers to join the union within sixty days of hire or 
pay an agency fee.81 Non-unionized teachers, represented by the union 
 
 77 Id. 
 78 Brief of the Am. Fed’n of Labor and Cong. of Indus. Orgs. as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Appellant, Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-205). 
 79 Cover, supra note 76. 
 80 Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 81 The union security clause required that newly hired workers either comply with the 
union shop clause provision and join the union after a certain period of time or remain non-
members but pay agency fees under the agency shop clause provision. Id. at 212. 
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but not members of it, alleged a First Amendment violation.82 The pur-
ported violation was two-fold: the non-unionized teachers asserted that 
the union shop clause, requiring teachers to join the union, violated their 
freedom of association, and that the imposition of an agency fee if they 
did not join violated free speech principles because the union was in-
volved in a “variety of activities and programs which [were] economic, 
political, professional, scientific and religious in nature of which Plain-
tiffs [did] not approve, and in which they [would have had] no voice, and 
which [were] not and [would] not be collective bargaining activities.”83 
The Supreme Court wove together miscellaneous labor precedent on 
the subject of union security clauses, compulsory speech, and fees paid 
for collective bargaining expenses in the fair share, anti-free rider tradi-
tion, noting Congressional interest in “peaceful labor relations,”84 and 
writing that there was “no evidence that union dues were used to force 
ideological conformity or otherwise to impair the free expression of em-
ployees.”85 Past precedent, however, suggested that “assessments” im-
posed on employees “not germane to collective bargaining . . . [would 
present] a different problem.”86 This problem—presenting “questions of 
the utmost gravity”—arose in Machinists v. Street.87 There the Court 
found that only costs associated with collective bargaining were aligned 
with Congress’s thinking on the permissibility of union shop agreements. 
To justify the charging of fees to non-members, the money had to be spent 
on the issues lent importance by Congress in the Railway Labor Act—
those related to collective bargaining.88 
Having tangled together a number of First Amendment concepts—
freedom of association, political speech or expenditure, as well as some 
unexplored appeals to principles against compelled speech—the Court cut 
the doctrinal Gordian knot.89 Largely dispatching with the question of free 
association and with compelled speech, the Court found that agency fees 
spent on the bargaining process and maintenance of the contract were 
 
 82 Alana Semuels, Why Are Unions So Worried About an Upcoming Supreme Court 
Case?, ATLANTIC (Jan. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/23R2-AM5X. 
 83 Abood, 431 U.S. at 213 (quotation marks omitted). Also note that it was not immedi-
ately clear what these “religious” activities and programs were. An amicus brief was submitted 
by the National Education Association suggesting that the plaintiffs objected to paying fees 
because supporting collective bargaining itself was against their religious convictions. See 
Brief Amicus Curiae for the National Educ. Ass’n at 25-29, Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Educ., 
431 U.S. 209 (2007) (No. 75-1153), 1976 WL 181674, at *25-29. 
 84 Abood, 431 U.S. at 219. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 219-20 (quoting Int’l. Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961)). 
 88 Int’l. Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 761-62 (1961). 
 89 Abood, 431 U.S. at 233-37. 
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constitutional under the First Amendment, per Congress and basic eco-
nomic principles of fairness, as well as some lingering anxiety regarding 
labor unrest.90 Additionally, the Court held, agency fees spent on political 
causes violated the First Amendment, writing that “an individual should 
be free to believe as he will . . . in a free society one’s beliefs should be 
shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State . . . 
[by] requiring any of the appellants to contribute to the support of an ide-
ological cause he may oppose as a condition of holding a job as a public 
schoolteacher.”91 
Abood created the distinction between agency fees and member 
dues,92 and peeled away the first layer of the expressly political. For the 
next four decades, the power of organized labor ebbed.93 In 2014, the 
Court heard Harris v. Quinn,94 a case that, “while not quite the stake in 
the heart that would kill public employee unions altogether,”95 in the glee-
ful estimation of conservative scholars,96 “at least made Abood a ghoul, 
one of the walking dead.”97 This metaphor was a bit premature. Harris 
dealt the precedent a heavy blow, but did not kill it, let alone bury it.98 
Harris is narrow, if telling, in its predation on a vulnerable group gener-
ally left out of labor rights protections—home health care workers.99 The 
 
 90 See Int’l. Ass’n of Machinists, 367 U.S. at 767-69. 
 91 Abood, 431 U.S. at 235 (internal citations omitted). 
 92 See Semuels, supra note 82. 
 93 See, e.g., GERALD MAYER, UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, CONG. 
RES. SERV. 10-12 (2004), https://perma.cc/D2TW-QM5X (tracking declining union member-
ship trends.). 
 94 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014). 
 95 John Eastman, Harris v. Quinn Symposium: Abood and the Walking Dead, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 30, 2014, 6:09 PM), https://perma.cc/X2C6-MADH. 
 96 John Eastman—in addition to authoring this vampire/zombie metaphor—was, among 
other things, a former clerk for Justice Clarence Thomas. See Dr. John Eastman, CHAPMAN 
UNIV., https://perma.cc/52SU-5SRC (last visited May 6, 2018). 
 97 Eastman, supra note 95. Eastman argues that Abood was poorly reasoned, and so do I, 
but for a different reason. While Eastman finds the justification for preserving the constitu-
tionality of agency fees to be shoddy, see id., I find the rhetoric of free speech and individual 
autonomy to be untethered. 
 98 Harris did not overturn Abood. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2621 (referring to Abood’s ques-
tionable foundations, but finding that it is not controlling here). 
 99 Home care workers have long been an object of exclusion and exception. To prevent 
Black women from accessing New Deal labor benefits under the National Labor Relations Act 
and the Fair Labor Standards Act, “domestic workers”—a coded term understood to encom-
pass a significant portion of the Black, female workforce—were left out of minimum wage, 
overtime, and organizing protections. See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, The Echoes of Slavery: Recog-
nizing the Racist Origins of the Agricultural and Domestic Worker Exclusion from the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 72 OHIO STATE L.J. 95, 96 (2011) (“[T]he statutory exclusion 
of . . . domestic employees was well-understood as a race-neutral proxy for excluding blacks 
from statutory benefits and protections made available to most whites.”). In fact, home care 
workers employed by third party organizations were only recently able to access fair labor 
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plaintiffs in Harris were a group of home health care workers paid with 
state and federal Medicaid funds and were represented by the Service Em-
ployees International Union.100 Justice Alito wrote for the majority that 
the specific circumstances of home health care workers’ employment ren-
dered them “quasi” public employees not subject to the Abood holding.101 
Harris took from Abood what it could, but left the constitutionality of 
agency fees intact. 
Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association was intended to be a 
more comprehensive Harris. Non-unionized, fee-paying public school 
teachers covered by the California Teachers Association’s collective bar-
gaining agreement brought suit alleging that the payment of fees toward 
collective bargaining costs itself was political.102 Departing from Abood, 
the Court seemed prepared to agree. The non-unionized teachers lost in 
the United States District Court in the Central District of California and 
again in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
both of which were bound by the Abood precedent.103 In fact, the plaintiffs 
asked for a judgment in favor of the defendants, to appeal to the Supreme 
Court as quickly as possible because the lower federal courts did not have 
the power to overrule Abood.104 
Despite the sound reliance of the District Court and Court of Appeals 
on past precedent, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.105 This signaled 
a willingness on the part of at least four justices106 to reconsider the Abood 
holding. 
The precarious position of agency fees relative to political speech, if 
evident when the case was accepted, was made more so as the arguments 
played out before the Court. At oral argument, Justice Scalia explained, 
 
standards protections, in 2015. See generally Home Care Ass’n of Am. v. Weil, 799 F.3d 1084 
(D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2506 (2016) (mem.). 
 100 Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2626. 
 101 Id. at 2638. 
 102 See Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (mem.) (per cu-
riam), reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 2545 (2016) (mem.). 
 103 See Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, No. SACV 13-676-JLS (CWx), 2013 WL 
9825479 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2013); aff’d Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, No. 13-
57095, 2014 WL 10076847 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 104 Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and Memorandum 
of Points & Authorities in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Friedrichs v. 
California Teachers Ass’n, No. 8:13-cv-00676-JST-CW, 2013 WL 3878526 (C.D. Cal. July 
9, 2013) (“Plaintiffs concede that this Court should deny their Motion and, instead, grant judg-
ment on the pleadings to Defendants.”). 
 105 Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 2933 (June 30, 2015) (mem.) (grant-
ing petition for certiorari). 
 106 See Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. COURTS, https://perma.cc/QD8B-HE5F (discuss-
ing the convention that four justices must agree in order for a petition for writ of certiorari to 
be granted). 
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“everything that is collectively bargained is within the political sphere, 
almost by definition. Should the government pay higher wages or lesser 
wages? Should it promote teachers on the basis of seniority or on the basis 
of—all of those questions are necessarily political questions.”107 Chief 
Justice Roberts also appeared to conclude that collective bargaining and 
the union were political by nature, asking the union to name a term in a 
collective bargaining agreement within the public sector that did not “pre-
sent a public policy question.”108 When the union suggested mileage re-
imbursement rates, the amount of money an employer should reimburse 
an employee for miles driven within the scope of employment,109 the 
Chief Justice answered, “That’s money. That’s how much money is going 
to have to be paid to the teachers. If you give more mileage expenses, that 
costs more money.”110 Following Justice Roberts’ logic, the question of 
whether work should be paid is political speech under the First Amend-
ment.111 
When Friedrichs was before the Supreme Court, another case that 
brought an identical theory, Janus v. American Federation of State, 
County, and Municipal Employees Council 31, was stayed at the district 
court pending Friedrichs’ outcome.112 The Janus plaintiffs, who had pre-
viously filed an amicus brief in support of the Friedrichs petitioners when 
certiorari was pending,113 were employees of the state of Illinois.114 When 
 
 107 Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 
1083 (2016) (No. 14-915). 
 108 Id. at 46. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 This logic suggests that any bargained-for expenditure by the state, in its capacity as 
an employer, on its employees, is political. If the collective bargaining agreement calls for 
teachers to be paid for work performed, and the plaintiffs argue that the payment of agency 
fees is an endorsement of such term, it then follows that they are being asked to endorse the 
notion that teachers should be paid for the work they perform. While Roberts’ anxiety seems 
to come in part from the fact that the state, not a private employer, is paying the wages, then 
the reasoning, however reductive, stands. Is the issue then taken with the payment of public 
employees for their work? And if so, is the issue then with the functioning of the state itself? 
Admittedly, perhaps advocates of the state’s destruction would have a reason to suggest that 
state employees not be paid for their work. 
 112 Appellant’s Brief and Short Appendix at 3, Janus v. AFSCME, 851 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 
2017) (No. 16-3638) (“[T]he district court stayed the case pending the outcome in Friedrichs 
v. California Teachers Ass’n.”). 
 113 See generally Brief of Illinois State Workers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (No. 14-915). 
 114 Janus v. AFSCME, 851 F.3d 746, 747-48 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 54 
(2017) (mem.). The named plaintiff, Mark Janus, is an employee of the Illinois Department of 
Healthcare and Family Services, and a second plaintiff, Marie Quigley, is an employee of the 
Illinois Department of Public Health, are included non-union members in agency-shop bar-
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Justice Scalia died, and Friedrichs fell back down to the precedent-faith-
ful Ninth Circuit, Janus moved forward, losing in the District Court of the 
Northern District of Illinois, and then, in March 2017, at the Circuit Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.115 Having exhausted their appeals in 
the lower courts, the plaintiffs-appellants filed for a writ of certiorari in 
June 2017.116 Certiorari was granted three months later, in an effort to 
address the lingering question of the constitutionality of agency fees in 
Friedrichs. Ultimately, Janus arrived at the Supreme Court and fell right 
into the lap of Neil Gorsuch. 
Janus is faithful to Friedrichs, mimicking the potentially successful 
argument with which Justice Scalia—and the four justices who, when the 
Court found itself equally divided, would have held for the appellants—
appeared to agree at oral argument:117 that agency fees are viol ative of 
the First Amendment because the plaintiffs do not agree with collective 
bargaining activities.118 The issue is framed in the familiar language of 
the union opposition—a powerful and bloated bureaucratic enterprise 
leeches money from hardworking people against their will; the plaintiffs’ 
brief summarizes the argument by writing that the union “violate[s plain-
tiffs’] First Amendment rights by forcing them to subsidize their unions’ 
 
gaining units organized under the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Em-
ployees (AFSCME). Id.; Brief for Respondent at 12, Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S.Ct. 2448 (2018) 
(No. 16-1466). The third plaintiff, Brian Trygg, is an employee of the Illinois Department of 
Transportation, and is a non-member in a unit organized by General Teamsters/Professional 
& Technical Employees Local No. 916. Janus v. AFSCME, 851 F.3d 746, 747-48 (7th Cir. 
2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 54 (2017) (mem.). [Should this all be cited to recent decision?] 
 115 Id. Though understood to be more conservative than the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, see, e.g., Andreas Broscheid, Comparing Circuits: Are Some U.S. Courts 
of Appeal More Liberal or Conservative Than Others?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 171, 171 (2011) 
(cataloguing some of the ire leveled at the supposed liberal proclivities of the Ninth Circuit), 
where Friedrichs was heard, neither the Seventh or the Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals had 
the authority to overturn the Supreme Court’s ruling in Abood. See Janus, 851 F.3d. at 747-
48 (“Of course, only the Supreme Court has the power, if it so chooses, to overrule Abood. 
Janus and Trygg acknowledge that they therefore cannot prevail either in the district court or 
in our court—that their case must travel through both lower courts—district court and court 
of appeals—before they can seek review by the Supreme Court.”). 
 116 Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 
SCOTUSBLOG, https://perma.cc/G2EQ-ZHGR (last visited Apr. 18, 2018). 
 117 See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, 
136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (No. 14-915). 
 118 See Appellant’s Brief and Short Appendix at 3, Janus v. AFSCME, 851 F.3d 746 (7th 
Cir. 2017) (No. 16-3638); cf. Brief for Petitioner, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, 136 
S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (No. 14-915). 
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bargaining-related activities, not-withstanding their deeply held opposi-
tion to the positions their unions advance in collective bargaining.”119 
The Janus brief mentions the issue of “compelled expressive associ-
ation,”120 but locates its primary argument in a “political speech” theory 
to address what the petitioners and union opponents perceive as the mis-
takes of Abood.121 Taking cues from Harris and the Friedrichs oral argu-
ment, Janus nests that argument in the fact that the unions operate within 
the public sector, and that the employer they bargain with is the govern-
ment.122 The fact of state action is used not only as a foundation for the 
constitutional claim, but also as a tool to convey the political nature of the 
collective bargaining itself; petitioners argue that because the union ne-
gotiates with a state actor, collective bargaining is, by association, politi-
cal. 
In referring to collective bargaining by a public-sector union as 
“speech directed at the government,”123 Janus claims that “bargaining 
with government is indistinguishable from lobbying.”124 This is a conjec-
tural step from Harris, where the Court wrote that: 
Abood failed to appreciate the conceptual difficulty of distin-
guishing in public-sector cases between union expenditures that 
are made for collective-bargaining purposes and those that are 
made to achieve political ends. In the private sector, the line is 
easier to see. Collective bargaining concerns the union’s dealings 
with the employer; political advocacy and lobbying are directed 
at the government. But in the public sector, both collective-bar-
gaining and political advocacy and lobbying are directed at the 
government.125 
 
 119 Though the brief refers repeatedly to “their unions,” the plaintiffs are would-be free 
riders who are non-members of the defendant unions. See Appellant’s Brief and Short Appen-
dix at 2, Janus v. AFSCME, 851 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 120 Id. at 6. 
 121 The contention of petitioners is that “[t]he Abood Court fundamentally misunderstood 
the difference between government authorizing compulsory fee arrangements between private 
parties . . . and government itself seizing compulsory fees from individuals, which is the situ-
ation in the public sector . . . . Here, Illinois directly seizes agency fees from State employees.” 
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). 
 122 See id. 
 123 Id. at 7 (quotation marks omitted). 
 124 Id. at 8. 
 125 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2632-33 (2014). 
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And yet, the Court did not overrule Abood, nor does acknowledging 
“the conceptual difficulty of distinguishing”126 between political expendi-
ture and expenditure germane to collective bargaining deny that the two 
are, in fact, distinguishable. 
At oral argument, the Friedrichs petitioners became entangled in a 
variety of distinctions and did not have the opportunity to argue, with any 
substance, that collective bargaining as purportedly inherently political 
had some relationship to the government employers. When asked what 
effect a favorable ruling would have on private sector unions, petitioners 
responded that it would have no effect—the First Amendment challenge 
would not be tenable, and in a private sector scenario, the government 
passively allows, rather than affirmatively requires, agency fees to be 
paid.127 This maneuver invited a slate of questions as to the state action of 
statutory requirements—whether the passing of a statute is itself state ac-
tion, for instance—that unions be allowed to negotiate union or agency 
shops.128 
Having spent these questions emphasizing the difference in public 
and private sector unions, Justice Kagan challenged petitioners to differ-
entiate between the employer in those contexts: 
One of the points of . . . public employee cases . . . is essentially 
to ensure that when the government acts as an employer, that the 
government be put in the same position as a private employer . . . 
the various constraints that would constrain the government when 
its acting as sovereign fall away and a different and lesser set of 
constraints apply that are meant essentially to ensure that the gov-
ernment doesn’t use its position as leverage over things it oughtn’t 
to be able to control, but that the government can do the same 
things that a private employer can. And so why doesn’t this fall 
within that category of things? In other words, you’ve just said 
private employer can decide to do this. That’s not a constitutional 
problem. So too with the government employer.129 
The petitioners’ answer was premised on the distinction between public 
and private employers, rather than between the government’s role as a 
sovereign and employer.130 The Janus brief does not address these ques-
 
 126 Id. at 2632. 
 127 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 
1083 (2016) (No. 14-915). The questions about statutory state action went largely unanswered. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Despite what looked like missteps in an argument which bore the burden of overturning 
established precedent, Friedrichs was favored to be decided in favor of the petitioners. Janus 
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tions, but instead leans heavily on the notion of government as simulta-
neous employer and policymaker; likewise, at oral argument the sover-
eignty notion was barely touched on.131 
The Janus brief does not extensively deal with the question—of the 
apparently inherently political nature of public sector bargaining—that 
the Friedrichs petitioners were unable to flesh out during oral argument 
and does not explain—beyond the insistence that both are speech directed 
at the government—the manner in which collective bargaining and lob-
bying are indistinguishable. 
At oral argument in Friedrichs, the petitioners’ argued that “collec-
tive bargaining is unique, because it requires public officials to meet and 
negotiate in good faith and mediate any impasses with unions,” empha-
sizing the good faith requirement, codified in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, suggesting that it makes the government a captive audience to 
union wants.132 The government cannot “close their door whenever they 
want,” as in a lobbying scenario.133 This is advanced notwithstanding the 
fact that it may undermine the argument that the two processes of lobby-
ing and bargaining are “indistinguishable”134 to suggest that in regards to 
the standards of conduct in contract negotiation, “none of that exists in 
lobbying.”135 The impression of the captive government official was evi-
dently convincing to Justice Kennedy, who offered, as something the hy-
pothetical government official and bargaining representative might dis-
cuss, a “public relations campaign.”136 
Conspicuously absent was any discussion regarding to what body the 
fees, and the lobbying expenditures, might go. There was no explanation 
 
appears to be modeled not only on the most successful arguments but on arguments the court 
has heard before, however ill-argued in the first case. 
 131 Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 
1083 (2016) (No. 14-915); Appellant’s Brief and Short Appendix at 7-8, Janus v. AFSCME, 
851 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-3638). 
 132 Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 
1083 (2016) (No. 14-915); see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1974). 
 133 Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 
1083 (2016) (No. 14-915). 
 134 Appellant’s Brief and Short Appendix at 8, Janus v. AFSCME, 851 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 
2017) (No. 16-3638). 
 135 Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 
1083 (2016) (No. 14-915). 
 136 Somewhat different from the terms suggested by the Janus plaintiffs themselves: “Illi-
nois law provides that union representation extends to bargaining over wages, hours of em-
ployment, and other terms and conditions of employment, including health and other benefits. 
These issues—the spending of public dollars and the operation of state government—are all 
inherently political in nature, and are matters on which individuals may and do have different 
opinions.” Appellant’s Brief and Short Appendix at 7, Janus v. AFSCME, 851 F.3d 746 (7th 
Cir. 2017) (No. 16-3638). 
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of whether agency fees are kept in the care of the union, and spent on 
issues deemed germane to collective bargaining, while lobbying money 
goes to legislators and organizations unaffiliated with the union. For its 
part, the Janus brief does not anticipate an argument of this nature. 
Borrowing from Harris, the Janus brief also argues that there is “no 
cognizable interest, let alone a compelling or important one, in preventing 
employees, or anyone else, from supposedly ‘free riding’ on political ad-
vocacy.”137 This is, again, a rather generous step from the precedent, 
which nonetheless expresses a disdain for the free rider problem.138 The 
Court writes in Harris that “[p]reventing nonmembers from free-riding 
on the union’s efforts is a rationale generally insufficient to overcome 
First Amendment objections.”139 This dismissal is coupled with a com-
pelled speech argument.140 In Friedrichs, it is clumsily made: following 
an avowal that the union’s right of exclusive representation is not at issue 
and not troubling to the petitioners,141 the petitioners went on to say, “we 
are required to free ride on the union because they are the exclusive rep-
resentative and we don’t have our own vehicle.”142 The Janus brief char-
acterizes this as a “forced ride.”143 Thus, the charge of free ridership is 
conveyed as a malicious charlatan—a coercive condition attempting to 
pass as a government interest. 
Against the impressive heft of the critical First Amendment rights, 
then, the free rider problem evidently weighs not at all. One wonders why 
free ridership does not inspire, as it does in the context of the commons,144 
from which it was derived, a sense of exploitation and community disen-
gagement.145 Whether such connotations even register on the scale oppo-
site the First Amendment is a question beyond the threshold inquiry: why 
are unions not considered collective assets which confer benefits accessi-
ble by the entire community? Why are unions not conceived of as re-
sources maintained as a mutual responsibility, subject to profiteering by 
those who would take without giving? 
 
 137 Id. 
 138 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2621 (2014). 
 139 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 140 Id. 
 141 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 
1083 (2016) (No. 14-915) (referring to exclusive representation as “fine with us”). 
 142 Id. at 4. 
 143 Appellant’s Brief and Short Appendix at 8, Janus v. AFSCME, 851 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 
2017) (No. 16-3638). 
 144 A “resource [which] is openly accessible to all within a community regardless of the 
entity’s identity or intended use.” Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure 
and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 921 (2005). 
 145 RUSSELL HARDIN, The Free Rider Problem, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (2003). 
314 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:2 
III. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROFIT: AGENCY SHOP UNIONS AS THE 
COMMONS 
A. The Infrastructures of the Commons: Commonality of Access 
In envisioning the commons, one might think back to a high school 
social studies or history class on the commons and their infamous “trag-
edy;”146 a sensationalized or disdainful account of Easter Island,147 or per-
haps an exercise in which students role-play resource consumers and have 
the opportunity to deplete—or refrain from depleting—a shared pool of 
something valuable.148 One might also think of that quaint community 
 
 146 The “tragedy of the commons” is an economic thought problem and cautionary tale 
which postures that if every individual acts in her own interest, without regard for the needs 
of others, in relationship to a common resource, the resource will be depleted as the demand—
for immediate economic gain—outstrips the natural supply. See GARRETT HARDIN, Tragedy 
of the Commons, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS AND 
LIBERTY (2008), https://perma.cc/VDZ8-RRE6 (last visited Apr. 18, 2018). 
  The problem presents almost as a critique to unbridled free market economics, which 
both assumes and celebrates the idea that each market participant will act in her own interest 
to produce and consume as many commodities as possible without regulation, thereby keeping 
the nature of the transactional market on even keel. 
  The central question is ultimately of the nature of rationality and individualism. Free 
market economics favors a rabid individualism, postulating that “rationality” means the rapa-
cious monopolizing of resources. The tragedy of the commons, to the contrary, suggests that 
a rational consumption strategy is to limit consumption and regulate the individual drive to 
accumulate—which it acknowledges, in some sense, as an inherent human weakness—lest it 
fully overtake supply. In other words, one theory suggests that individualism balances the 
economy, while the other suggests that it destroys it. 
  For more on classic economic theory, see generally ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS (Edwin Cannan, ed. 2015) (1776); but cf. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL 
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY (Geoff Tily ed., 2007) (1936); cf. THOMAS 
PIKETTY, THE ECONOMICS OF INEQUALITY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2015) (1997). 
 147 The story goes that an agricultural community on an isolated island off of the coast of 
Chile engaged in “slash-and-burn” farming, in which trees were burned to clear and enrich 
farmland. Robert Krulwich, What Happened on Easter Island—A New (Even Scarier) Sce-
nario, NPR (Dec. 10, 2013, 8:41 AM), https://perma.cc/YL4U-M837. The farmers, imprudent 
about the trees’ timeline and capacity for replenishment, depleted so many that the island be-
came barren and infertile. Id. This scenario was held up in historical accounts as the “clearest 
example of a society that destroyed itself by overexploiting its own resources.” Id. (quoting 
Jared Diamond). This story has been challenged in recent years based on evidence that the 
flora of the island suffered not from over-farming but from the inadvertent introduction of an 
invasive species of rat which ate its way through every root structure it came across. Id. In this 
telling, the farming community is resourceful rather than foolish, adapting to the island’s 
quickly homogenizing ecosystem by rejuvenating the soil with mineral-rich rocks, and eating 
the invasive rats. Id. 
 148 In my case, it was a pan covered by a tinfoil sheet. Students could reach in, feel around, 
and gather as many chocolate kisses as they felt suited their purposes. After everyone had a 
chance to “go fishing,” my 12th-grade science teacher, playing God, would peek under the 
tinfoil and replenish the kisses, a new generation, according to how many were left. By the 
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idyll—the common square at the center of town, replete with privately-
owned grazing animals, privately-farmed vegetables in public plots, and 
a public gossip-network of townspeople leaning on their herding and 
farming implements.149 
The notion of what the commons is has been changing, or expanding, 
as the nature of infrastructure, and the notion of something that is publicly 
available, changes. Professor Brett Frischmann categorizes different com-
monly-managed infrastructures. “Traditional infrastructures,” usually 
owned by private corporations, but which may be owned by public enti-
ties,150 are “managed in a manner whereby all members of a community 
who wish to use the resources may do so.”151 As an example he offers 
common carriers: roads, canals, railroads, telephones, and the postal ser-
vice.152 He notes that access to these conduits is neither free (one still has 
to pay the fare for the subway, the stamp for one’s mail) nor unregulated 
 
time we students, as a community, realized that our own gain was another’s everlasting loss, 
it was too late, and the chocolate kiss ecosystem had dried up. 
 149 See David Harvey, The Political Economy of Public Space, in THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC 
SPACE (Setha Low & Neil Smith eds., 2005). 
  Though an argument that unions constitute the commons of a particular workspace is 
not predicated on the notion that unions are similar—in a corporeal sense—to the public 
square, the union does have something of the tenor of a meeting place. The notion that each 
chapter of a union is called a “local,” the antiquated practice of gathering in a “hiring hall,” 
the understanding of union business conducted collectively, at a meeting with membership—
these cultural perceptions coalesce around the suggestion of a physical meeting space, an ex-
change of ideas accessible to passersby. 
 150 The fact of the public sector being unionized, and the anxiety of the Janus plaintiffs 
around the involvement of government, do not ruffle an understanding of the commons. “Two 
generalizations about traditional infrastructure are worth noting. First, the government has 
played and continues to play a significant and widely-accepted role in ensuring the provision 
of many traditional infrastructures. While private parties and markets play an increasingly 
important role in providing many types of traditional infrastructure (due to a wave of privati-
zation as well as cooperative ventures between industry and government), the government’s 
position as provider, coordinator, or regulator of traditional infrastructure provision remains 
intact in most communities.” Frischmann, supra note 144, at 925. 
  This is not to suggest that the union as commons is limited to the public sector, an 
analysis of access and positive externalities applies equally to the private sector. It is rather to 
demonstrate that an anxiety about a government relationship to a common resource is out of 
keeping with commonly-managed infrastructure. In respect to commons management, the un-
ion is something of an anomaly, because of its non-profit status. In commons structures, either 
the government, a private entity, or both administer the common resource, here, the union—
neither government or a traditional “private” entity like a corporation, but rather a non-profit—
administers itself. 
 151 Frischmann, supra note 144, at 925. 
 152 Id. 
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(“transportation of hazardous substances by highway or mail, for exam-
ple, is heavily regulated”153), but that they are available to the entire com-
munity “regardless of the identity of the end-user or the end-use.”154 In 
addition to carriers, he includes in the “traditional infrastructure” classi-
fication public service conduits like water systems and sewage systems. 
He also includes more abstracted public-service conduits—public school 
systems and the court system.155 
Alternately, there are “non-traditional infrastructures,” which in-
clude environmental resources (“lakes, the atmosphere, and ecosys-
tems”); information resources (“basic research, abstract ideas, and oper-
ating systems”); and Internet resources (“interconnected computer 
networks . . . and data transfer”).156 
i.  A Common(s) Characteristic: Positive Externalities 
The commons is characterized in part by its generation of “positive 
externalities,” in classical economics understood to be a sort of additional 
output157—as when matter is burned and produces light and heat158—that 
benefits a third party. A broader conceptualization of positive externali-
ties is in terms of infrastructure which produces “private gains . . . accom-
panied by additional large social gains.”159 
A commonly-cited example160 of a positive externality is the circum-
stance of the beekeeper: she manages an apiary, and the bees produce 
honey, which has a positive outcome161 for the beekeeper. The bees pro-
duce an additional positive outcome which does not benefit the beekeeper 
alone—by travelling from flower to flower, pollinating them—the bee has 
 
 153 Id. at 926. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 924. 
 156 Id. at 927-28. 
 157 Frischmann, supra note 144, at 924. 
 158 A physicist would not like this metaphor, the component parts of light and heat already 
apparently being present in the matter. But for the rest of us, it seems like a marvelous two-
for-one. 
 159 W. EDWARD STEINMUELLER, Technological Infrastructure in Information Technology 
Industries, in TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY 117 (Morris Teubal et al. eds., 1996) 
(discussing the traditional idea of infrastructure, largely in terms of transportation and com-
munication networks, which were owned by private entities which stood to gain from their 
expansion, and explaining the generation of an additional, social good, as well as a private 
profit). 
 160 See, e.g., Positive Externality, FUNDAMENTAL FIN.: ECON., https://perma.cc/6MYH-
MHG6 (last visited May 26, 2018). 
 161 This example is a friendly one for the math-averse and communists alike—the positive 
outcome of the honey, in this instance, need not be commodified. The beekeeper may sell the 
honey and make a profit with which to invest in more bees, and/or boost the economy, but the 
benefit might be of a kind outside of the market—she might enjoy her tea more. 
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a positive effect on the surrounding community, producing ecological di-
versity and fertility, yielding, for example, vegetables.162 The notion of 
this external, societal benefit, could be expanded beyond the quantifia-
ble—vegetable yield, relative biodiversity—to the less tangible. Here, the 
ecological products and capacity for more products are the societal bene-
fit, but one could extrapolate on this idea to count, as an output, the un-
nameable benefits, the effects on society, that living in a community re-
plete with contented bees163 and large flowers might have. 
This is a rather simplified scenario, and not an ideal illustration of a 
common resource—to fit bees neatly into the “non-traditional infrastruc-
ture” category, one must imagine a beekeeper who goes out into the pub-
lic world, peering into the cavities of trees, rather than a beekeeper who 
builds a manufactured apiary, or owns the land where the hollow tree 
stands. But it stands as a clear example of positive externalities which are 
easily lent to the commons which Frischmann lists. 
The more accessible a common resource, the more amplified the pos-
itive externalities. Frischmann cites legal scholar and economic theorist 
Professor Carol Rose: 
Rose was the first to draw an explicit, causal connection between 
open access and these positive externalities. In her path-breaking 
article, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and 
Inherently Public Property, Rose explained that a “comedy of the 
commons” arises where open access to a resource leads to scale 
returns—greater social value with greater use of the resource. 
With respect to road systems, for example, Rose considered com-
merce to be an “interactive practice whose exponential returns to 
increasing participation run on without limit . . . . Through ever-
expanding commerce, the nation becomes ever-wealthier, and 
hence trade and commerce routes must be held open to the public, 
even if contrary to private interest. Instead of worrying that too 
 
 162 Again, these vegetables produced as positive externalities could have a commodity 
value in the agricultural industry, or a non-commodity value, such as food not exchanged for 
money. 
 163 An economically-oriented workers’ rights perspective might prompt one to ask after 
the benefits to the bees, the real workers in this scenario. Their honey is taken from them 
without just compensation, and the benefits that vegetables and a vegetable-rich community 
might have do not fall on them. To assure oneself that a bee’s (free) labor benefits the bee for 
the sake of making our world function a little better, and thus the bee, is perhaps safer from 
the effects that societal turmoil might have on the bee-community, is to invite troublesome 
logical extremes extending to human workers. The quandary of the benefit to the bees is out-
side of the scope of the article, and of the textbook illustration, but it is a genuinely important 
one simply because it calls on a user of common resources to consider who benefits, and who 
does not. In the agency fee scenario, discussed infra Part II, the union, akin to the hive, is 
benefitted. As for the bees, we may be free-riding on them. 
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many people will engage in commerce, we worry that too few will 
undertake the effort.”164 
The positive externality Rose raises is a quantifiable, economic one: 
the increased wealth of the nation and the proliferation of commerce. 
There are non-quantifiable, social benefits as well. Road systems offer not 
only access to commerce but access to variable communities. The more 
road systems are utilized, the more communication is fostered between 
different groups of people, leading not merely to a proliferation of com-
merce but a proliferation of ideas.165 
B. The Union as the Commons 
The commons is generally understood as a “resource [which] is 
openly accessible to all within a community regardless of the entity’s 
identity or intended use.”166 If an agency-shop workplace,167 in which 
some workers are union members and others are not, the union is never-
theless accessible to all. Despite variation in use, it is a resource from 
which all of the workers can draw some kind of output—be it a quantifi-
able, economic output, or a non-quantifiable output. 
Imagining the union as a commons does not require great intellectual 
flexibility, as it fits neatly into the economic framework of commonly 
 
 164 Frischmann, supra note 144, at 928 (alteration in original). 
 165 This has been evident in history: global trade in the late middle ages resulted in an 
expansion in global commerce and increased communication amongst disparate communities. 
It must be noted that this sort of expansion of trade and exchange also produced a number of 
negative externalities: colonization, not least. 
  In Rose’s example, limited to the nation, this negative externality in its modern form 
could—and has—emerged as well, in gentrification. These outputs being non-quantifiable, a 
cost-benefit analysis fails—but the question of whether the costs of exploitation and violent 
displacement outweigh the benefits of communication and commerce is a horrifying one: they 
cannot. In the context of the union as commons, happily, this negative externality does not 
result; unions, rather than gentrifying or colonizing a community, are oriented toward the al-
leviation of poverty and collective action—arguably the opposite. 
 166 Frischmann, supra note 144, at 921. 
 167 The theory of the union as a commons extends to the contract administration and work-
place context, not necessarily to political lobbying contexts—that exploration is outside of the 
scope of this article. Though the theory of the union as commons would apply in an open shop 
context (an open shop being one in which only union members pay dues and fees, and non-
members are not required to pay an agency fee despite the fact that the contract applies to 
them; this is the model employed in right-to-work states), or in a union shop context (in which 
workers are required to join the union following a grace period after they are hired), those 
contexts are outside of the scope of this paper. For the purposes of examining the interaction 
between the First Amendment arguments, free rider problem, and the fate of a maltreated 
common resource, here the environment of the theory of union as commons extends only to 
the agency shop context. 
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managed infrastructure. Unions mimic commonly-held traditional infra-
structures in myriad ways if the scope of the community is limited to the 
workplace or industry.168 Like traditional commonly-managed infrastruc-
tures, all members of the community benefit from the union, regardless 
of who the “end-user” is, union-member or non-union member.169 Per-
haps more analogous to schools and court systems than to conduit-like 
infrastructures, unions nevertheless evince the collectivity of a shared 
commute or water system. At the courthouse, one must have standing and 
a claim; to participate in the union, one must merely be a worker. 
The agency fee is easily conceptualized like a postage stamp or a 
subway fare—it is the toll one pays to access the benefit. A counterargu-
ment favored by libertarians, free-market adherents, and anti-union forces 
turns on the First Amendment argument often sidelined in judicial chal-
lenges to agency fees, in favor of political speech: compelled speech. The 
argument goes something like this: one chooses to ride the subway.170 
 
 168 A literal-minded critique of an argument for unions as the commons would note that 
the union is disqualified because the entirety of the community, conceptualized regionally 
rather than bounded by workplace or industry, cannot use the services of the union (at least 
not directly). This argument is unconvincing; the services of a public school, for example, are 
not available to the middle-aged members of a community. Additionally, many labor rights 
organizations are, in fact, organized by region. See JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: 
ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE DREAM 13 (2006). 
 169 See 48 AM. JUR. 2D LABOR AND LABOR RELATIONS § 1071 (2d ed., 2018) (explaining 
the union’s status as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of every worker in the 
bargaining unit, regardless of membership). 
 170 This brings to mind a would-be parable of the Trump era. Betsy DeVos, the Trump-
appointed Secretary of Education whose controversial Senate confirmation hearing required 
the Vice President to break a tie for the first time in history, see Emmarie Huetteman & 
Yamiche Alcindor, Betsy Devos Confirmed as Education Secretary; Pence Breaks Tie, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 7, 2017), https://perma.cc/KP2X-XGNA, is nearly synonymous with privatization 
and the diminishment of the commons of the nation’s public school systems. See Joanne Bar-
kan, Milton Friedman, Betsy DeVos, and the Privatization of Public Education, DISSENT (Jan. 
17, 2017), https://perma.cc/KB4X-VW9T. DeVos is best known for her championing of 
“school choice,” a catch-all term for a variety of ways in which children and parents are dis-
incentivized from using public education systems. See Anya Kamenetz, Under DeVos, Here’s 
How School Choice Might Work, NPR (Jan. 31, 2017, 11:44 AM), https://perma.cc/VZP5-
4RZX. Ms. DeVos, in an address at a Brookings Institute event, comparing school choice to a 
choice of transportation, remarked: 
 
How many of you got here today in an Uber, or Lyft, or another ridesharing service? 
Did you choose that because it was more convenient than hoping a taxi would drive 
by? Even if you didn’t use a ridesharing service, I’m sure most of you at least have 
the app on your phone. 
 
Just as the traditional taxi system revolted against ridesharing, so too does the edu-
cation establishment feel threatened by the rise of school choice. In both cases, the 
entrenched status quo has resisted models that empower individuals. 
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This preoccupation with choice runs saliently through the Friedrichs oral 
arguments,171 the Janus brief, and the public proselytizing of right-to-
work forces.172 Setting aside an argument as to whether one really chooses 
to use the subway if the circumstances of one’s life make that commute 
more or less necessary, an equally near-sighted counter to the choice ar-
gument might be that one “chooses” to work in an agency shop work-
place.173 
i. Positive Externalities in the Union Commons 
As with the case of the beekeeper and her community, unions create 
benefits for the communities in which they are situated. For the workers—
 
Nobody mandates that you take an Uber over a taxi, nor should they. But if you 
think ridesharing is the best option for you, the government shouldn’t get in your 
way. 
  Valerie Strauss, Devos: Picking a School Should Be Like Choosing Among Uber, Lyft 
or a Taxi, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/A4L8-BGVB. 
  In addition to incurring ire for the premise of the statement, comparing the right to 
procure an education to a “ordinary consumer decision,” see Chris Weller, Betsy Devos Com-
pared School Choice to Taking Uber Over a Taxi—Here’s Why That Could Be Troubling, 
BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 30, 2017, 12:32 AM), https://perma.cc/HR49-HUK6, Secretary DeVos 
was ridiculed for her analogy, offering three expensive, private methods of transport rather 
than a common carrier, see Amy X. Wang, Betsy Devos Thinks Choosing Schools Should Be 
Like Uber or Lyft—But Both Are for the Wealthy, QUARTZ (Apr. 3, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/B8QK-QYLP (“Though most of the educated researchers in the audience 
may’ve been familiar with Uber or Lyft, DeVos meant for her comparison to apply to all 
families in the US—and most of them have never even touched a ride-sharing app. The Pew 
Research Center found in 2016 that only 15% of Americans have used one.”). 
  Secretary DeVos’ rather oblivious illustration betrays the fact that there is no space for 
the commons, nor the commoners who cannot afford chauffeur services, in the Trump admin-
istration’s deconstruction of the administrative state and reconstruction, in its place, of a pri-
vate one. In fact, there is not even a place for the commons or commons-users in their meta-
phors. 
 171 “Justice Scalia: Mr. Carvin, is—is it okay to force somebody to contribute to a cause 
he does believe in? Mr. Carvin [lawyer for the plaintiffs]: I wouldn’t think, Your Honor, that 
you could force Republicans to give contributions.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Frie-
drichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (No. 14-915). 
 172 Patrick Hughes, the Liberty Justice Center lawyer representing the Janus plaintiffs, told 
Fox News, “This is America. If you want to be part of a union God bless you . . . . If you don’t 
want to be part of a union, if you don’t want to support their speech or their collective bar-
gaining, no one should force you to be part of it.” Matt Finn, Right-to-Work Court Case Could 
Have National Impact on Unions, FOX NEWS: POLITICS (Feb. 10, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/LXM3-NX49. 
 173 This argument is problematic, not only in its petulance, but because of its tacit sugges-
tion that if a would-be free rider should seek employment in a non-unionized workplace, there 
should be non-unionized workplaces to benefit such people. This runs counter to the position 
of the author and to one of this article’s ultimate points—a crusade of union-weakening and 
the creation of a fee structure system that promotes less (or worse) no unionization is a societal 
ill. 
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both union members and non-union members, akin here to the bee-
keeper174—the union confers the benefit of coverage by the collective bar-
gaining agreement, which might include the terms: wages higher than in-
dustry standard; overtime pay; paid leave policies; severance pay; 
medical benefits; and so forth. 
For society, in terms of quantifiable benefits, the union confers those 
economic positive externalities which result from a well-paid, well-
rested, healthy labor force: a higher standard of living and an invigorated 
economy, in which workers can afford to buy the products they make and 
utilize the services they provide,175 and increased productivity.176 Unions 
also drive up the standard for workplaces outside of the one where the 
union is organized.177 
In terms of non-quantifiable benefits, the union creates a culture of 
worker empowerment, a society that expects more than a modicum of la-
bor rights enforcement.178 A higher standard of living naturally results in 
a lessening of societal anxiety around downward economic mobility and 
instills a sense of financial stability.179 Society-wide, this effect could be 
subtle but transformative. 
As access to a common resource increases, the scale of the positive 
externality increases.180 An expansion in access to the union—increased 
unionization, that is—would result in these quantifiable benefits and non-
quantifiable benefits proliferating throughout communities to which the 
common resource, the union, was extended. 
Figure 1 demonstrates the analogous terms between the beekeeping 




 174 See Fig. 1 for a comparison of the illustration to the agency shop scenario. 
 175 See, e.g., Kai Filion, Increases in Minimum Wage Boost Consumer Spending, ECON. 
POL. INST. (May 27, 2009), https://perma.cc/Y7HB-4ZPV. 
 176 See, e.g., Justin Wolfers & Jan Zilinsky, Higher Wages for Low-Income Workers Lead 
to Higher Productivity, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Jan. 13, 2015, 9:45 AM), 
https://perma.cc/BU3K-AKD8. 
 177 See Matthew Walters & Lawrence Michel, How Unions Help All Workers, ECON. POL. 
INST. (Aug. 26, 2003), https://perma.cc/Q8P7-A6KD. 
 178 See Josh Bivens et al., How Today’s Unions Help Working People, ECON. POL. INST. 
(Aug. 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/PTS5-WU7N. 
 179 See, e.g., Bill Gardener, How to Improve Mental Health in America: Raise the Mini-
mum Wage, NEW REPUBLIC (May 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/7SZZ-5B5X. 
 180 Frischmann, supra note 144, at 928-29 (citing Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Com-
mons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 711 
(1986)). 
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Private benefit: the honey 
 
 
Workers [Members and Non-mem-
bers] 
Private benefit: benefits of the con-
tract 
 






Non-quantifiable benefit: a 
community made more lovely 
and more livable. 
 
Society2 / The Beneficiary of the 
Externality 
 
Quantifiable benefit: standards for 
wages and benefits driven up; 
higher earning power in the com-
munity; an invigorated economy 
and higher standard of living; in-
creased productivity 
 
Non-quantifiable benefit: a notion 
of social mobility and economic 
stability, a culture of worker em-
powerment, and an expectation of 
enforcement of labor rights. 
 
1 Scope of society: the apiary, 
neighboring farms, the larger 
world 
2 Scope of society: the workplace, 
other workplaces 
C. The Tragedy of the First Amendment Theory of Agency Fees 
The typing of agency fees as political speech, as proffered by Janus 
and Friedrichs, frustrates—or is frustrated by—the theory of the union as 
commons. In the construction of the commons as a fee-based infrastruc-
ture—as is the case with tolled roadways, the postal service, and the sub-
way, for example, not to mention tax-funded resources like sidewalks and 
public schools—the fee is well-understood as a communal contribution to 
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the function of the system, a charge to maintain access and facilitate the 
production of positive externalities. 
That it might be compelled, coerced, is not debated in a traditional 
commons context. The fee is tendered with an understanding that it is 
necessary—not on a personal level—but to preserve the operation. A 
postage stamp is required to send a letter, though more than 49¢ is re-
quired for the actual process. The accumulation of stamps paid for by the 
larger community assures that the letter will be sent.181 
The argument that collective bargaining itself is political is likewise 
incongruous with the commons. Where one does not “agree” with a com-
mon resource, one nonetheless understands its funding to be a condition 
of community; free riding on the commons is cognizable as a detriment 
to others. Likewise, the coalescing of the political around the identity of 
commons users, or the identity of the common resource itself—even 
though the resource may be regulated, and the users may be regulated, in 
turn—notions of “the political” do not adhere. The identities of other sub-
way riders on one’s morning commute do not make political the operation 
of the trains; the resource is accessible “regardless of the identity of the 
end-user.”182 
Though the government’s relationship to public sector unions is dif-
ferent from its relationship to (other) common resources, it is in the union 
context less touched by the fee structure. Where the government admin-
isters a fee-based common resource, it collects the fee—the money flows 
directly to the government. Here, the fee flows to the common resource 
to fund its function, negotiation with an employer, which in this instance, 
happens to be the government. 
The narrative espoused by right-to-work advocates, by the Janus 
plaintiffs, the narrative rejected in Abood and interrupted in Friedrichs, 
becomes absurd where one employs an understanding of the union as the 
commons. The narrative of a “forced” ride; a coercion; a difference in 
agreement; a violation of the right to dissent; a minimizing of free-rid-
ership as inconsequential, unconcerning; a blurred layering of the politi-
cal; a “politicizing” of identities; a political sovereign dressed up as an 
employer—none of it coheres with the framework of the common re-
source. 
 
 181 This is a simplified, but fair evaluation of the economic forces driving the postal ser-
vice. For a detailed analysis of how cost and production operate in the context of the United 
States Postal Service, see David Weinberg, Why it Makes Economic Sense to Send a Letter for 
49 cents, MARKETPLACE (Apr. 25, 2014, 4:30 PM), https://perma.cc/949T-FCUA. 
 182 Frischmann, supra note 144, at 926. 
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CONCLUSION: THE DISSONANCE OF FIRST AMENDMENT OPPOSITION 
The agency fee structure is a miniature administrative state itself, a 
function within a commons that manufactures and administers its own 
benefits in a self-sufficient loop. The deconstruction of the agency fee 
structure and the precedent that it rested on shrinks the notion of the union 
as a common resource, subject to free rider issues. It simultaneously 
moves the union further into the “political,” paints it with the brush of 
stratification, categorization, exclusion, the opposite of a common re-
source. 
In a practical sense, the further the union is pushed into association 
with the political, the public, the more it will be forced to recede, first into 
the private and next out of existence. 
Framing the union as a commons exposes the shadow logic of a the-
ory of agency fees as political speech; if we understand the union as a 
commons, collective bargaining as a political undertaking is only feasible 
if we understand subway riding as inherently political, the postal service 
as inherently political. Such examples make clear that the theory is not a 
theory at all, but a masquerade, the deploy of First Amendment doc-
trine as cover for an agenda which has as its principal line-item the de-
construction of the administrative state—of municipal functions and ad-
ministrative national functions; transport networks, communication 
networks—and the corresponding rise of the state of private capital. 
In the fight for deconstruction, the free speech clause is an appealing 
weapon for those in the pro-dismantlement camp, conjuring, as it does, 
the capitalistic notion of a “marketplace of ideas,” capturing the notion of 
individual rights pitted bravely against the majority.183 
 
 183 First articulated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes the theory suggests that where free 
speech is unfettered, ideas which are more “correct” will rise to a place of influence, while 
lesser ideas, of lesser quality, will sink below the current in the stream of intellectual com-
merce. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes 
wrote, “[t]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas . . . the best test of 
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.” Id. 
The concept is preposterous for many reasons, too numerous to explore thoroughly here. How-
ever, it must be said that an unregulated economic marketplace benefits those who are already 
in a position of power, who enrich themselves by exploiting others. The marketplace of ideas 
theory was happily subscribed to by powerful men on the bench, who were likely never loudly 
drowned out by a know-it-all conversational partner, and who were reassured at every turn—
in the dominant pedagogy, in the values of the Western literary canon, in innumerable hierar-
chies of recognition—that their methods of logical reasoning were objectively the most cor-
rect. 
  “Free speech” is often invoked, not against the government, as the First Amendment 
requires, but as a kind of conversational talisman employed to insulate dissent, an unpopular 
opinion, or some kind of rude epithet. 
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And yet, following the thread of the free speech argument—an ob-
jection to endorsing negotiation itself—it seems that free speech has very 
little to do with it: unlike the endorsement of a political campaign, the 
opposition here—a purportedly political one—is to the very existence of 
the union. The goal then, is not to refrain from endorsing the fact of unions 
in the world, but to destroy them.  
The First Amendment argument posits that workers should not be 
forced to endorse a position they disagree with. Accepting the union as 
inherently political, the position such a worker takes issue with is the very 
existence, the legality, of collective bargaining—a right enshrined in an 
act of Congress184—and with the fact of unions, generally. An opposition 
to a body which discusses wages, hours, and safety measures, the nuts and 
bolts of work and the workplace. This is a dissonant notion, but more 
absurd when compared to common uses not codified in law—a political 
opposition to sending a letter, a distaste for the very notion of municipal 
transport. Ultimately, there is no political speech, compelled by the state. 
There is merely the naked desire to destroy the union totally. 
A successful deconstruction, a world of privatized commons, is al-
ready partially here. Janus is the tool that this historical moment has sent 




 184 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947). 
